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Abstract 
Vertical income differentials between occupational levels in South Africa are among 
the highest in the world. Under apartheid skilled work performed predominantly by 
white employees was artificially overvalued, while unskilled work performed pre-
dominantly by black employees was systematically undervalued. These discrimina-
tory social and legal norms laid the foundation for the existent disproportionate in-
come differentials. 
The post apartheid government headed by Nelson Mandela acknowledged the 
existence of the apartheid wage gap. They were mindful that the vertical pay gap 
need not only be ‛deracialized’,1 but needs to be eradicated. In this regard the South 
African Constitution of 1996 and the Employment Equity Act of 1998 (EEA) under-
pins the demand for non-discriminatory pay structures. Section 27 of the EEA was 
enacted to address disproportionate income differentials, but has not yet been ade-
quately implemented. 
The purpose of this thesis is to consider whether the Entgeltrahmenabkom-
men (ERA) (a general agreement on pay grades) which resulted in the redesign of the 
pay structure in the German metal and electrical industry correcting long-standing 
pay differentials between so-called blue and white collar workers, can add value to 
the implementation of section 27 of the EEA. The thesis consists of six chapters. Af-
ter the introduction chapter, chapters 2 and 3 consider the historical and current con-
text of income inequality in South Africa; and chapters 4 and 5 provide a detailed 
analysis of the ERA in Germany and the recommendations that derive from the ERA. 
Chapter 6 concludes the thesis. 
There are important lessons to be derived both from the drafting and the im-
plementation phases of the ERA. The ERA process revealed that being conscious of 
the different challenges that might arise in each phase is a prerequisite for success. 
                                                 
 
1
 Report of the Presidential Commission to Investigate Labour Market Policy: Restructuring the South 
African Labour Market, June 1996 (The Labour Market Commission), para 228. 
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The development of norms and benchmarks in the drafting phase minimised pay dis-
crimination. The implementation phase of the ERA showed that prejudicial views 
and attitudes can hinder the complete eradication of discriminatory payment prac-
tices if sufficient heed is not paid to their strong influential role. 
This thesis concludes that the lessons derived from the implementation of the 
ERA can assist in introducing proportionate vertical income differentials as required 
by section 27 of the EEA.  
Proportionate Income Differentials, p 8 of 186 
 
 
1. Introduction 
The South African Constitution2 is centred on redressing unjust social divisions 
through the introduction of provisions that promote equality.3 The legal concept of 
equality consists of both formal and substantive equality. Substantive equality differs 
considerably from formal equality. 
Formal equality is the notion that everyone is equal before the law and enjoys 
equal rights and protection from the law.4 It concentrates on the formal treatment of 
individuals according to legislation. The Constitution seeks to establish a society 
founded on substantive equality and prohibits unfair discrimination.5 In labour law 
substantive equality is centred on the evaluation of the personal performance of an 
abstract individual.6 Formal equality on the other hand overlooks the personal cir-
cumstances of individuals and groups, their historical background, their social and 
economic situation, their opportunities or lack thereof, whether they were previously 
discriminated against and the lasting effects of systemic discrimination on their cur-
rent condition.7 
In contrast, the concept of substantive equality is deduced from the insight 
that structural and systemic circumstances can prevent the access to equal opportuni-
ties for some individuals or groups.8 Substantive equality therefore consists of the in-
troduction of legal measures to redress inequalities inherited from the past and to 
promote the advancement of disadvantaged groups. Disadvantaged groups are given 
                                                 
 
2
 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (Constitution) of 1996. 
3
 Section 1 of the Constitution; section 9 of the Constitution. 
4
 Currie, Iain & De Waal, Johan. (2013). The Bill of Rights Handbook, 5 ed, 213. 
5
 De Vos, Pierre (Ed); Freedman, Warren (Ed); Brand, Danie; Gevers, Christopher; Govender, Kathi-
gasen; Lenaghan, Patricia; Mailula, Douglas; Ntlama; Nomthandazo; Sibanda, Sanele & Stone, Lee 
South African Constitutional law in Context Oxford University Press (2014) 421. 
6
 Fredman, Sandra ‛Providing equality: Substantive equality and the positive duty to provideʼ 
S.Afr.J.on Hum.Rts. vol 21 (2005) 163-190, 165. 
7
 De Vos et al (2014), 421. 
8
 Ibid, 422. 
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preferential treatment because substantive equality acknowledges that historical dis-
crimination shaped current opportunities and living conditions according to ‘race’ 
and gender.9 Formal equality discards this context by disregarding the disparities be-
tween previously advantaged and previously disadvantaged vulnerable groups.10 The 
specific approach of substantive equality is to remedy the systematic wrongs inher-
ited from the past through measures that advance equality such as affirmative action, 
for example.11  
The Constitution of South Africa promotes substantivr equality.12 Section 1 
of the Constitution provides that South Africa is built on the foundational values of 
human dignity, the attainment of equality, non-racialism and non-sexism.13 Section 9 
(2) of the Constitution declares that ‛equality includes the full and equal enjoyment 
of all rights and freedoms.ʼ14 In National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v 
Minister of Justice the following was said: 
‘It is insufficient for the Constitution merely to ensure, through its Bill of Rights, 
that statutory provisions which have caused such unfair discrimination in the past are 
eliminated. Past unfair discrimination frequently has ongoing negative conse-
quences, the continuation of which is not halted immediately when the initial causes 
thereof are eliminated, and unless remedied, may continue for a substantial time and 
even indefinitely.’15 
                                                 
 
9
 Fredman (2005), 165. 
10
 Currie & De Waal (2013), 213; De Vos et al (2014), 422. 
11
 De Vos et al (2014), 422. 
12
 Albertyn, Catherine, & Fredman, Sandra (2015). Equality beyond dignity: Multi-dimensional equal-
ity and justice Langa's judgments: Part III: Reflections on Themes in Justice Langa's Judgments. Acta 
Juridica: A Transformative Justice-Essays in Honour of Pius Langa, 430-455, 433; Currie & De 
Waal, 214, Fn. 19. 
13
 Section 1 of the Constitution. 
14
 Section 9 (2) sentence 1 of the Constitution. 
15
 National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality and Another v Minister of Justice and Others 
(CCT11/98) [1998] ZACC 15, para 60. 
Proportionate Income Differentials, p 10 of 186 
 
 
The above quotation is taken from the Constitutional court decision, National Coali-
tion for Gay and Lesbian Equality and Another v Minister of Justice and others,16 the 
Constitutional Court importantly noted that substantive equality includes ‘remedial 
or restitutionary equality’.17 This restitutionary component of substantive equality 
contains ‘the start of a credible and abiding process of reparation for past exclusion, 
dispossession, and indignity within the discipline of our constitutional framework.’18  
It is with this constitutional understanding of substantive equality that legisla-
tion was subsequently drafted with the intent of realizing the constitutional call for 
equality in all spheres of life.19 The legislation introduced to promote equality is of 
significant importance to this thesis and will be briefly discussed below. 
In 2000, to promote section 9 of the Constitution, the legislator passed the 
Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act (PEPUDA).20 
This legislation states in the definition-clause that equality ‘includes the full and 
equal enjoyment of rights and freedoms as contemplated in the Constitution and in-
cludes de jure and de facto equality and also equality in terms of outcome.’21 
In order to address workplace inequality more specifically, the Employment 
Equity Act was drafted and enacted in 1998.22 The achievement of equality within 
the workplace is the central objective of the Employment Equity Act (EEA). It in-
cludes section 27 of the EEA, a provision that calls for the progressive realisation of 
proportionate income differentials between the top and the bottom income earners in 
                                                 
 
16
 (CCT11/98) [1998] ZACC 15 
17
 National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality and Another v Minister of Justice and Others 
(CCT11/98) [1998] ZACC 15, para 60; Minister of Finance and Other v Van Heerden (CCT 63/03) 
[2004] ZACC 3, para 31. 
18
 Minister of Finance and Other v Van Heerden (CCT 63/03) [2004] ZACC 3, para 25. 
19
 For example the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act (PEPUDA), 
Act No. 4 of 2000. 
20
 See footnote 18. 
21
 Section 1 (1) of the PEPUDA. 
22
 Preamble of the Employment Equity Act (EEA), Act No. 55 of 1998. 
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the country.23 In PEPUDA the legislator stated that disproportionate vertical income 
differentials are an ongoing disadvantage inherited from the past.24 
Taking into account the restitutionary approach of s 9 of the Constitution, the 
specified guidance given in PEPUDA and section 27 of the EEA can be considered 
as a significant substantive equality measure to remedy the continuing effect of past 
discrimination on the existing disproportionate income structure in South Africa. 
1.1. Presentation of the problem 
In a business, the contributions of its employees and the productive output of the es-
tablishment are interlinked.25 The various employees whose efforts contribute to an 
establishment’s productivity receive different incomes. In a hospital doctors, for ex-
ample, receive higher pay than nurses. While numerous professionals are necessary 
for the productivity of an establishment, the shares of income received by different 
occupational levels vary to a great extent. This may flow from the continuance of ex-
isting pay structures. When new persons are hired or existing workers are promoted 
they are classified in existing pay structures.26 In addition, new establishments follow 
existing models, at least as a benchmark.27 For example a new hospital will generally 
adopt existing wage structures as to how employees of a hospital are remunerated; 
this may be because the people they wish to employ are familiar with such a remu-
neration structure. This often results in wage structures being inherited from the past 
without any modification, adaptation or updating to suit current circumstances and 
                                                 
 
23
 Helm, Ruediger (2015). The Vertical Effect of Section 27 of the Employment Equity Act Develop-
ment and Labour Monograph Series, Institute of Development and Labour Law, University of Cape 
Town, 63. 
24
 Section 1 of the PEPUDA. 
25
 Böckerman, Petri & Ilmakunnas, Pekka (2012). The job satisfaction-productivity nexus: A study us-
ing matched survey and register data. Industrial & Labor Relations Review, 65(2), 244-262. 
26
 Bahnmüller, Reinhard ‛Diesseits und jenseits des Flächentarifvertrags. Entgeltfindung und Entgelt-
strukturen in tarifgebundenen und nicht tarifgebundenen Unternehmenʼ Industrielle Beziehungen/The 
German Journal of Industrial Relations (2002), 402-424, 407. 
27
 Ibid. 
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conditions. It is evident that this is the case in South Africa, where past views and at-
titudes on remuneration have largely influenced the existing pay structure.28 
Formative views and attitudes of every generation track and record the views 
of the dominant social group. In a male-dominated society men are given preferential 
access to leadership positions.29 The influence of views and attitudes can result in 
discriminatory income differentials within and between the occupational levels, as is 
visible in South Africa today.30 Existing wage structures stand in contrast with the 
present law on equality. These pay structures are often traditionally characterised and 
shaped by the formative views and attitudes of the past.  
The income differentials between the occupational levels that exist today 
arise from multiple factors. One such factor is that the wage structure is shaped by 
outdated views that fail to account for new social views and realities. To provide an 
example looking at the position in Germany, the former wage structure in the Ger-
man Metal Industry was based on outdated practices, views and attitudes such as the 
distinction between white and blue collar workers.31 The lack of adaptation and de-
velopment of the former collective wage agreements in the workplace made these in-
creasingly inappropriate and inapplicable in present times.32 Ultimately, the debate 
on the former wage system resulted in the complete revision of the wage structure in 
                                                 
 
28
 Section 27 of the PEPUDA. 
29
 Ryan, Michelle K.; Haslam, S. Alexander; Morgenroth, Thekla; Rink, Floor; Stoker, Janka & Pe-
ters, Kim ‛Getting on top of the glass cliff: Reviewing a decade of evidence, explanations, and impactʼ 
The Leadership Quarterly, vol 27 No 3 (2016) 446-455, 448. 
30
 Triventi, Moris ‛The gender wage gap and its institutional context: A comparative analysis of Euro-
pean graduatesʼ Work, Employment & Society (2013)., 27(4), 563-580, 574. 
31
 Berthold Huber, the former head of the IG Metall and former head of the IG Metall region Baden-
Wuerttemberg was the pioneer and champion of the ERA-Agreements. He described this development 
in a telephone interview on the 12th of November 2015. During the industrialization, in the 1920s and 
beyond white collar workers were called the officials of the employer. There was a strict differentia-
tion between the white and the blue collar workers. The technical developments within the workplace 
and changing views and attitudes progressively removed the initial justification for the differentiation. 
From the 1960s the justification for the differentiation decreased. 
32
 Brandl, Sebastian in Bahnmüller, Reinhard, & Schmidt, Werner Riskante Modernisierung des Tarif-
systems: Die Reform der Entgeltrahmenabkommen am Beispiel der Metall- und Elektroindustrie Ba-
den-Wuerttembergs edition sigma. (2009), 9. 
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this sector in the 1990s.33 It is evident that the existing South African wage structure 
will require similar revision, or modification and/or adaptation to bring it in line with 
existing equality law.  
Unjust income differentials between the top and the bottom levels of an estab-
lishment are a long-standing but current local and global issue. The ILO Declaration 
of Philadelphia from 1944 provides that it is important ‛to ensure a just share of the 
fruits of progress to all’.34 The claim for ‘a just share to all’ raises the question of 
what can be said to be a just share to all, to what extent can income differences be-
tween occupational levels be considered proportional or deemed just? In 1996 The 
Presidential Commission to Investigate Labour Market Policy (hereinafter: Labour 
Market Commission) called on the legislator to address this issue: 
‘When, for example, are wage differentials justified between different categories of 
workers, what is the legitimate extent of these differentials, and what are the best 
methods for identifying and rectifying inequitable differentials?’35 
An issue of pertinence to the Labour Market Commission was the achievement of 
proportionate pay differentials between different occupational levels. They assessed 
how this can be realized, not only conceptually, but also, practically. As the Labour 
Market Commission stated in 1996: 
‘The Commission is mindful that discrimination in remuneration persists and needs 
to be addressed in ways that are both conceptually and practically demanding.’36 
Conceptual and practical solutions to the wage gap were discussed by South African 
society in various forums and section 27 of the EEA was ultimately drafted.37 The 
                                                 
 
33
 ERA negotiations occurred in the 1990s. 
34
 ILO Declaration concerning the aims and purposes of the International Labour Organisation (Decla-
ration of Philadelphia) of 10 May 1944 (1944), Chapter III (d). 
35
 Report of the Labour Market Commission (1996), par 473. 
36
 Report of the Labour Market Commission (1996), par 473. 
37
 For a discussion on the vertical effect of section 27 EEA addressing income differentials between 
the top and the bottom occupational levels see Helm (2015). 
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historical background that led to the drafting of section 27 will be set out herein be-
low. 
South Africa has been described as one of the ‛most unequal societies’38 in 
the world. In the context of income distribution, there are consistent inequalities by 
‛race’39 and gender. The vertical wage gap was intensified through apartheid; greater 
resources were put into employing the privileged minority while the costs of employ-
ing the majority were reduced.40 Therefore, a national approach was needed in order 
to ‛flatten hierarchies’41 and reduce wage inequalities between the occupational lev-
els. 
‘Race continues to dominate every measure of labour market inequality, including 
relative wage levels. ... On its own, however, it will not change the reality that sees 
black wage earners (particularly women) clustered in the lowest paying sectors and 
occupations while their white, usually male counterparts continue to dominate the 
choice sectors and occupations.’42 
In 1998, it was submitted by the Congress of South African Trade Unions (CO-
SATU) that legislation addressing disproportionate income differentials in South Af-
rica, should not only be confined to ‛horizontal equity’ in order to attain proportion-
ate income differentials, but should address the  
‛huge ‛vertical inequityʼ - between those at the bottom and those at the top’.43  
                                                 
 
38
 Report of the Labour Market Commission (1996), par 2.1.1. 
39
 ‘Race’ ‘is a social and not a scientific concept’ (Hepple, Bob Equality: The legal framework 
Bloomsbury Publishing (2014), 45.); for the avoidance of doubt the word ‘race’ is set into quotation 
marks. 
40
 Green Paper: Employment and Occupational Equity, 01. July 1996, Notice 804 of 1996, Depart-
ment of Labour, Ministry of Labour, Employment Equity: policy proposal (Green Paper) Chapter 2, 
par 2.4.5. 
41
 Report of the Labour Market Commission (1996), par 504. 
42
 Report of the Labour Market Commission (1996), par 18. 
43
 COSATU Parliamentary Submission on the Employment Equity Bill, presented to the Portfolio 
Committee on Labour, 22 July 1998 (Cosatu Submission), Chapter: ‛Core areas of concern - Closing 
the apartheid wage gap’, no 8 and 11. 
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This was especially called for since discrimination had a great effect on income dif-
ferentials.44 Not only have the historically disadvantaged groups received dispropor-
tionately low wages, the whole structure of earnings was so disproportionate that it 
was ‛unusually skew.’45 
‛The Commission believes that pay differentials between the highest and lowest paid 
in South Africa are extremely high both by developed and developing country stan-
dards.’46 
The First Employment Equity Bill was introduced in 1997.47 The Bill disapproved of 
the vertical wage gap.48 The Bill included equity plans and other instruments for af-
firmative action,49 but a legal instrument that could act against the vertical wage gap 
was not included. Instruments such as qualification, affirmative action and equity 
plans can be effective against horizontal inequality and, combined with education, 
against some forms of vertical inequality.  
Following the introduction of the first bill the Minister called for broad dis-
cussion on the bill and effective measures to redress inequality.50 In 1998 three fur-
ther bills51 followed; and a submission from COSATU contributed to the introduc-
tion of the third bill which included section 27 of the EEA to address the apartheid 
wage gap.52 Parliament had to clarify and examine the issue on how to address the 
                                                 
 
44
 Report of he Labour Market Commission (1996), par 431. 
45
 Green Paper (1996), Chapter 2, par 2.4.6. 
46
 Report of the Labour Market Commission (1996), par 226. 
47
 Employment Equity Bill no 1840 of 1997. 
48
 Employment Equity Bill no 1840 of 1997, Chapter: ‘The legacy of discrimination’, 6: ‘The Labour 
Market Commission notes that our skewed income distribution is reflected in the fact that the bottom 
20% of income earners capture a mere 1,5% of national income, while the wealthiest 10% of house-
holds receive fully50% of national income.’ It is evident that the legislature acknowledged the exist-
ing vertical wage inequality. 
49
 Employment Equity Bill no 1840 of 1997, s 12. 
50
 Employment Equity Bill no 1840 of 1997, Chapter: ‛A note from the Minister’, 3. 
51
 Employment Equity Bill no 60 of 1998; Employment Equity Bill no 60a of 1998; Employment Eq-
uity Bill no 60b of 1998. 
52
 Employment Equity Bill (B 60a-89) of 1 September 1998, section 27. 
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vertical wage gap in detail. Parliament acknowledged the COSATU submission and 
accepted the proposed provisions with some adopted changes. The legislature added 
further subsections to the proposal of COSATU and drafted the final version of sec-
tion 27 of the EEA.53 
Legislative proposals were presented and the result was the provision in sec-
tion 27 of the EEA.54 The National Assembly agreed to amend the bill to include this 
section dealing with the vertical wage gap, in the affirmative action chapter. 
This new provision in the Act introduced a proposal of ‛Measures to promote 
the reduction of income differentials’.55 
Excerpt from section 27 of the EEA (Income differentials; Act no. 55 of 1998): 
(1) (...).  
(2)  Where disproportionate income differentials, are reflected (...) a designated em-
ployer must take measures to progressively reduce such differentials (...). 
(3) The measures referred to in subsection (2) may include 
(a) collective bargaining; (...) 
(c) applying the norms and benchmarks set by the Employment Conditions Com-
mission; (...) 
(e) other measures that are appropriate in the circumstances. 
(4) The Employment Conditions Commission must research and investigate norms 
and benchmarks for proportionate income differentials and advise the Minister 
on appropriate measures for reducing disproportional differentials. (...)56 
                                                 
 
53
 Employment Equity Bill (B 60a-89) of 1 September 1998, section 27. 
54
 Note that section 27 of the EEA was amended by the Employment Equity Amendment Act No. 47 
of 2013, commenced on 16 January 2016. This amendment however leaves the initial objective of the 
provision unaffected. 
55
 COSATU Submission (1998), ‛Annexure A: Reducing the Apartheid Wage Gap’, no 4. 
56
 This provision has been introduced as a direct means to reduce the vertical wage gap (see section 27 
(2) of the EEA in conjunction with the EEA 4 form, Regulations No. R. 1360 of 1999; Minutes of the 
Parliamentary Monitoring Group 27 July 1998, Chapters 11 AND 111: ‛The apartheid wage gap’). 
Proportionate Income Differentials, p 17 of 186 
 
 
Subsection (3) of the norm adopts collective bargaining57 as one of the suggested 
measures an employer may take to reduce the vertical wage gap. In addition, the pro-
vision calls for the Employment Conditions Commission (ECC) to investigate norms 
and benchmarks for proportional income differentials.58 
The final version of section 27 of the EEA addresses disproportionate vertical 
wage differentials and targets a long period of discrimination and selective privileg-
ing.59 This provision was bold and broke new legislative ground in South Africa. The 
provision is fundamentally different from many norms in equality law. It directly 
challenges disproportionate income differentials.60 
Credit must be given to section 27 of the EEA for providing a legal means of 
addressing pay differentials between the highest and the lowest occupational levels.61 
However without practical conceptualisation the objectives of section 27 of the EEA 
cannot be realised. The purpose of this thesis is to look at whether ERA can provide 
a starting point for the practical implementation of section 27 of the EEA. The dis-
cussion below will focus on the General Agreements on Pay Grades in the German 
metal and electrical industry. 
The old designs of General Agreements on Pay Grades in the German metal 
and electrical industry were considered outmoded at the end of the 1980s.62 Such 
agreements described the occupational levels and pay structures within an industry.63 
In the metal and electrical industry different wage systems for blue collar workers 
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(wage earners), commercial white collar workers (salary earners), technical white 
collar workers and master craftsmen existed in specific collective agreements shaped 
in the 1950s.64 
In the recent past the German labour market largely differentiated between 
these groups of employees. A distinction has been made between wage-earners and 
salary-earners. Wage-earners ‛perform work demanding predominantly physical ef-
fort’65 (physical labour) and can be described as manual, shop-floor or blue collar 
workers. Salary-earners are employees ‛who perform work demanding predomi-
nantly mental effort’66 (intellectual tasks) and could be described as office or white 
collar staff. This original distinction, dating back to industrialisation, differentiated 
between intellectual and manual work. The differentiation was based on the require-
ments of the job.67 
At the end of the 20th century the differentiation between the types of workers 
largely lost its justification. Between 1990 and 2010 judicial decisions68 and legisla-
tion69 largely abolished the distinction in Germany. The manual and intellectual re-
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quirements for employees converged progressively with technical development re-
sulting in the distinction being unjust and misplaced.70 
Up until the implementation of the ERA between 2000 and 2010, in the metal 
and electrical industry there were three core pay elements of the wage structure 
namely: (i) basic pay, (ii) performance related pay and (iii) payment for unfavourable 
working conditions and other stresses. The basic pay of white collar workers was 
generally higher than the basic pay of blue collar workers. The performance-related 
percentage of pay was much higher for blue collar workers than for white collar 
workers. In most cases for white collar workers around 10 percent of their salary was 
performance-related while for blue collar workers, doing piecework, 30 percent of 
their salary was performance-related.71 Therefore, white collar workers had a more 
stable income, while the income of blue collar workers was dependent on their per-
formance. 
The pay allowance for unfavourable working conditions and stresses was 
only afforded to blue collar workers and differed markedly between pay categories of 
blue collar workers.72 The most noticeable difference between the income of blue 
and white collar workers was that after three years of vocational training received by 
both blue and white collar workers, white collar workers still receive a higher income 
of up to 25 percent.73 
The payment structure for blue and white collar workers was set out in sepa-
rate collective agreements.74 The different collective agreements reflected an occupa-
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tional structure which no longer existed. In many cases the work done by workers of 
different occupational categories had become increasingly similar. With the introduc-
tion of new technology such as computers a blue collar worker became able to carry 
out tasks previously performed by white collar workers. Workers could use com-
puters to carry out tasks or the computers could perform the work for them. The 
work of white collar workers for example became devalued as the intellectual tasks 
they performed could be carried out by computers. This enabled blue collar workers 
to undertake part of the duties of white collar workers. To provide an example, com-
puters were able to make calculations which were previously made by white collar 
workers since it required some degree of intellectual ability. Blue collar workers now 
perform more skilled tasks by using new technology such as, for example, computer 
software to determine the necessities of the workplace. 
The different collective agreements setting out different occupational catego-
ries and occupational levels resulted in different wages for comparable work, compa-
rable performance and comparable workload. This was misplaced since the original 
distinction between the categories of workers was no longer fitting. In addition, as 
discussed above, technological development changed job profiles and these profiles 
were either insufficiently included or not included at all. 
The above-mentioned facts led to the existing ERA, for the metal and electri-
cal industry, becoming outdated and of diminishing importance. Several companies 
reacted to this problem by developing new, additional elements to the pay structure 
which were not embodied in and were incongruent with the existing collective 
agreements.75 This resulted in modifications in the pay structure of existing collec-
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tive agreements within companies which bypassed the objectives of the regulatory  
collective agreement parties.76 
As a result of these modifications to the pay structure, the collective bargain-
ing parties were gradually losing their constructive influence on the remuneration 
structure of the metal and electrical industry. The responsible regional committees of 
the IG Metall (the German metal workers trade union) and of Gesamtmetall (the em-
ployer umbrella organisation in the German metal and electrical industry) reached a 
compromise in the 1990s to negotiate revised general agreements on pay grades in 
different collective bargaining regions in order to retain their structural function.77 
The relevant regional employer organisation Südwestmetall (SWM)78 (direct transla-
tion: South West Metal) sees it as its ‘core competence to set out working conditions 
by collective agreements, to create a structure, and to support enterprises in putting 
collective agreements into practice.79 This structuring function is a specific character-
istic of several employer organisations in the metal and electrical industry, especially 
for the highly influential Südwestmetall.80 The decision had to be made between ei-
ther the loss of the significance of collective bargaining parties structuring working 
conditions in the industry or the development of a new concept for the pay struc-
ture.81 
After more than a decade of negotiations,82 the collective bargaining parties 
in the south-western German metal and electrical industry finally agreed in Septem-
ber 2003 on the new general agreement on pay grades, the ʻEntgeltrahmenabkommen 
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(ERA agreement)ʼ for the metal and electrical industry in the bargaining region Ba-
den-Wuerttemberg.83 In other regions the negotiations continued until 2006.84 The 
implementation of the agreements in the establishments also took time. The ERA 
implementation phase lasted up until 2009.85 This will be discussed in more detail in 
chapter 4 below. 
A general agreement on pay grades delineates norms and benchmarks for de-
termining the income of different occupational levels.86 These norms and bench-
marks are the long-term foundations of the remuneration structure contained in a col-
lective agreement. The normal annual negotiations on the level of remuneration in a 
branch are usually conducted on the basis of a general agreement on pay grades. 
With the implementation of the ERA agreements the unfair differentiation be-
tween different groups of workers performing work of equal value was reduced. 
Norms and benchmarks were developed to classify occupational levels in one stan-
dardised system for all employees in a bargaining region in the metal and electrical 
industry. This includes norms and benchmarks for proportionate income differentials.  
In this thesis it is suggested that an assessment of the norms and benchmarks for pro-
portionate income differentials established through the ERA agreements in Germany 
may assist in the determination of norms and benchmarks for proportionate income 
differentials in South Africa. 
1.2. Research question 
In South Africa section 27 (4) of the EEA requires the development of norms and 
benchmarks for proportionate income differentials.87 This includes the development 
                                                 
 
83
 ERA - general agreement on pay grades for the metal and electrical industry in Baden-
Wuerttemberg of 16 Sep 2003. 
84
 In the bargaining area Bavaria the parties agreed on ERA at the end of 2005. 
85
 This is the figure for Baden-Wuerttemberg. In Bavaria due to the later agreement the implementa-
tion took up until 2011. 
86
 Weiss (1992), par 595. 
87
 Section 27 of the EEA. 
Proportionate Income Differentials, p 23 of 186 
 
 
of benchmarks as well as norms for the determination of proportionality of incomes 
between the different occupational levels.88 Section 27 (4) of the EEA places the re-
sponsibility to conduct research on an identified party: ‘The Employment Conditions 
Commission must research norms and benchmarks for proportionate income differ-
entials’.89 The work by the Employment Conditions Commission has not yet been 
carried out. While there may be justification for this, the legislature`s requirement for 
research to find applicable measures for the eradication of unjust pay differentials 
remains unmet. 
Research on norms and benchmarks for proportional income differentials is 
long overdue as section 27(4) of the EEA has been in force since 199990 and should 
be put into practice. Research on measures of proportionality is especially important 
in order to give practical effect to section 27 (2) of the EEA by means of, for in-
stance, collective agreement. 
The ERA Agreements have been successfully implemented in the German 
metal and electrical industry through a diligent time-consuming process. In the nego-
tiations on these agreements, norms and benchmarks for proportionate wage struc-
tures have been developed as a means of eliminating unjustified income differentials. 
In the same manner section 27 of the EEA also aims to eliminate unjustified income 
differentials. Section 27 of the EEA and the ERA agreements for the different bar-
gaining regions in Germany share the common desire or aim to establish proportion-
ate income differentials. The motivation behind both section 27 of the EEA and the 
ERA agreements is the elimination of inequalities inherited from the past. As a result 
of the common aims discussed above, it is helpful to ascertain the lesson that can be 
derived from the German experience with the ERA agreements and their applicabil-
ity for the implementation of section 27 of the EEA. 
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Section 27 of the EEA sets out that employees with different workplace re-
quirements, should enjoy proportionate incomes.91 The consequence of this demand 
is that differences in income for comparable work and the extent thereof need to be 
justified. Norms and benchmarks to ensure proportionality between the incomes of 
employees with comparable or differing workplace requirements need to be estab-
lished.92 The ERA agreements encompass norms and benchmarks for a proportionate 
wage structure and, in doing so ensure the eventual elimination of disproportionate 
income differentials. 
The ERA agreements were realized through collective bargaining. Section 27 
of the EEA lists collective bargaining as an instrument to be used.93 
Gender pay inequality is an additional area of research which was focussed 
on during the realization of the ERA agreements. The inclusion of the discussion on 
the undervaluation of ‘female jobs’94 can thus attach additional value to the imple-
mentation of section 27 of the EEA and, even more specifically, aid in creating pro-
portionate income differentials. Aside from the core motive of the ERA agreements 
namely, overcoming disproportionate income differentials between wage and salary 
earners, the overriding concern was the creation of a non-discriminatory income 
structure in all respects. During the implementation of the ERA in the industry, re-
search revealed that the ERA assisted in reducing the gender pay gap, although this 
was not its core aim. In the same manner, the implementation of section 27 may aid 
in the elimination of gender wage discrimination in South Africa and lessons may be 
derived from the implementation of the ERA and its effects on the gender wage gap 
in the German metal and electrical industry. 
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The overriding question of this thesis is whether the ERA experience can add 
value to the prospective implementation of section 27 of the EEA? This entails an 
enquiry into the following -  
− Which factors affected the successful negotiations and implementation of 
the ERA agreements? 
− Which institutions were involved? 
− What were the difficulties faced? 
− What can be derived from this experience for the implementation of sec-
tion 27 of the EEA? 
1.3. Methodology 
The methodology of this thesis is a documentary analysis with a comparative ap-
proach. Desk-based research on the demands in the German metal and electrical in-
dustry for proportional income differentials was conducted. In the ERA agreements 
the bargaining parties in the German metal and electrical industry have agreed on 
norms and benchmarks aimed at proportional income differentials,95 this is, in effect, 
what section 27(4) of the EEA calls for. A documentary analysis of the German wage 
structure from a legal, sociological and economic perspective will be considered in 
this thesis. It will look at the outcome of the negotiations on the ERA agreements in 
Germany in order to draw conclusions and make deductions on how the issues dis-
cussed can play a role in the realization of section 27 of the EEA in South Africa. 
The thesis will consider the context of the ERA collective agreements, the 
framework of the pay grades in these agreements, the categorisation of the pay struc-
ture, and the responsible structures and actors for the implementation of the collec-
tive agreements. Opinions raised by authors who have discussed, researched and ana-
lysed the ERA will be considered,96 as well as the views and opinions of authors who 
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have analyzed the effect of the ERA on the reduction of disproportionate income dif-
ferentials. In the assessment of how ERA can aid in the implementation of section 27 
of the EEA, advice provided by writers for the improvement of ERA shall be taken 
into account. 
As ERA is relatively new and the history of section 27 of the EEA is recent 
this study will refer to modern sources such as online resources, specialists’ articles 
and recent research studies. These sources include a look at the outcome of the ERA 
agreements, in particular, the agreement in the bargaining region Baden-Wuerttem-
berg and its implementation. 
1.4. Structure of the thesis 
The thesis consists of five parts. In the first introductory section, the presentation of 
the problem is set out. The second part of the thesis deals with the historical back-
ground and theoretical framework of the wage inequalities in South Africa. The third 
part of the thesis sets out the South African legal framework. 
In the fourth part of the thesis, the ERA agreement is introduced and the rele-
vant content is explored. In this part of the study, the agreed result with particular at-
tention to the characteristics for the wage formation in Baden-Wuerttemberg will be 
considered, and some differences in other bargaining areas will be introduced. Gen-
erally, applicable principles will be extracted and presented. Secondly, aspects of the 
genesis of the ERA agreement will be described and the surrounding circumstances 
that led to its ultimate success will be analysed. 
In the fifth part of the thesis, recommendations are provided. Possible rec-
ommendations for the prospective implementation of section 27 of the EEA and the 
development of norms and benchmarks for proportionate income differentials will be 
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derived through looking at the ERA agreements. The sixth part consists of conclud-
ing remarks. 
1.5. Conclusion 
The implementation of section 27 of the EEA presents a number of challenges. The 
section calls for the eradication of disproportionate income differentials between the 
occupational levels,97 but no prototype exists in international legislation. However, 
the ERA agreements may add value to the prospective implementation of section 27 
of the EEA. General experience with Germanys ‛biggest wage reform project of the 
post-war history’98 and the complete redesign of a remuneration model of an industry 
may provide indications of how this can be successful. Ultimately, the intention in 
drafting the ERA agreement was to overcome an outdated unfair system to find a just 
wage for all employees.99 
The structures of norms and benchmarks created for the ERA are detailed and 
have been developed to reduce unjustifiable wage inequalities between different 
categories of workers.100 In section 27 (4) of the EEA the legislature calls for re-
search on norms and benchmarks to reduce wage inequality in a comparable way.101 
Although as the contexts in Germany and South Africa are, the questions to be an-
swered are comparable. 
‘When ... are wage differentials justified between different categories of workers, 
what is the legitimate extent of these differentials, and what are the best methods for 
identifying and rectifying inequitable differentials?’102  
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This justifies a more in-depth analysis of the problem in South Africa and the wage 
structure in Germany. 
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2. Income inequality in South Africa: a legislative history and the 
global context 
2.1. The genesis of income inequality 
The First Employment Equity Bill was introduced on 1 December 1997 and ‛to en-
rich’ the Bill the minister called for comments on The Bill.103 The Bill was the point 
of departure for discussions on inequality in the workplace. In the Explanatory 
memorandum of The Bill confirms the prolonged disproportionate development of 
the South African wage system and invites both South African workers and employ-
ers to take part in discussions about the elimination of all forms of discrimination 
within the workplace.104 The commentary on The Bill is of particular importance for 
this discussion as such deliberations highlighted the genesis of the extensive wage 
gap in South Africa.105 
The Employment Equity Bill condemned the vertical wage gap but there was 
no provision in the Bill that addressed the unequal wage gap. Under the headline 
‛INTRODUCTION’, the explanatory memorandum provides that: 
‘Apartheid has left behind a legacy of inequality. In the labour market the disparity 
in the ... incomes reveals the effects of discrimination (...). These disparities are rein-
forced by social practices which perpetuate discrimination in employment against 
these disadvantaged groups, as well as by factors outside the labour market, such as 
the lack of education, housing, medical care and transport.’106 
As is evident from the quote above, the inequalities present in the wage structure of 
South Africa today have been greatly affected by the country's apartheid history. 
‛From the time of Union, (white) artisans earned much higher wages in South Africa 
than in Britain. Although the cost of living for (white) working-class South Africans 
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was much higher, in part because expenses such as a domestic worker and a large 
house were necessities in South Africa but luxuries in Britain (and Australia), skilled 
(white) workers’ wages were high while unskilled (African) workers’ wages were 
low in comparison to their counterparts in Britain and Australia. In London or Mel-
bourne, a bricklayer was paid, at most, one-third more than a labourer in construc-
tion, but on the Witwatersrand (around Johannesburg), bricklayers were paid almost 
more than five times the wages paid to African labourers. (...) African labour was 
considered ‘cheap’ in South Africa because the state acted to suppress their wages so 
far below the inflated wages paid to white citizens.’107 
Although wage inequalities date back further than apartheid, the apartheid era was 
influential in the perpetuation of wage inequalities in South Africa.108 T.T. Mboweni, 
the first Minister of Labour109 of a democratic South Africa, confirmed that dispro-
portionate income differentials were worsened by the discriminatory apartheid era 
through protracted legal discrimination.110 During apartheid the preferential treat-
ment of the white minority and the discrimination against the larger black majority 
had the effect of solidifying and prolonging discriminatory pay practices. 
A divided social system like apartheid pushes out the high and low income 
levels with the effect of thinning out the middle. The ILO Wage Report 2014/2015 
not only pronounces South Africa as one of the most imbalanced countries (D9/D1-
ratio), but also as a nation with the greatest middle-class inequality (D7/D3-ratio).111 
This means that in South Africa the middle class income is highly imbalanced. 
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Figure 1:Genesis of a vertical pay gap 
The result of the discrimination of one group, combined with the favouring of an-
other group over a protracted period of time creates a divergent development within a 
pay system. The strict division and differential treatment of groups (which can be 
more than two) has the resultant effect of heightening inequality. 
Mboweni’s description of the effects of historical discrimination in South Af-
rica from 1997 offers supplementary backing for the conclusions of the ILO Wage 
Report 2014/2015.  
‘Pressed both by white employers and white workers, who shared an interest in the 
tight control of black labour, successive governments enacted a web of laws and 
regulations designed to guarantee and enshrine the superior economic status of 
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whites and to perpetuate a master-servant relationship between the races at all levels 
of society.’112 
‘Some expected reshuffling occurred, as skilled black Africans moved up the ladder 
and low-skilled whites moved down. But despite significant investment in education 
and a government vocally committed to fighting inequality, whites continue to earn 
more than blacks, and income became more concentrated in the top 10th.’113 
The legal framework of apartheid and its regulations enabled the successful division 
of the South African nation and had the effect of preserving and prolonging the 
‛master-servant’ relationship between the ‛races’.114 The apartheid system would not 
have been successful if the privileged minority received the same payment for work 
as the disadvantaged majority. The Employment Equity Bill of 1997 makes reference 
to the Green Paper on Employment and Occupational Equity (1996) confirming that 
the legal framework of apartheid had the effect of disproportionately reducing the 
costs of the majority work force and increasing the costs of employing a favoured 
minority.115 As a result, employers paid more for skilled workers in managerial posts 
and very little for unskilled workers.116 The repealed legislation that reinforced the 
vertical wage gap will be detailed below. 
2.2. Legal measures underpinning racial discrimination 
For a better understanding of the current inequalities in South Africa one has to trace 
back their origins. A look at the colonial and historical legislation can contribute to 
an understanding of inequality as inherited from the past.117 It will be demonstrated 
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below how past discriminatory views and attitudes were strengthened and perpetu-
ated by legislation. 
The apartheid laws enabled unequal land distribution, the exclusion of blacks 
from the evolution of urbanization through the concept of migrant labour, the physi-
cal separation of the black workforce from the white workforce especially during the 
period of industrialisation in the mining industry, separate access to educational op-
portunities and the distinction of rights between black and whites in the workplace 
and beyond.118 
With the arrival of the first Europeans land and water formed the basis of 
wealth accumulation.119 For 200 years, up until the end of the 19th century, the own-
ership of land placed these resources mostly into the hands of predominantly white 
groups or individuals. This enabled whites to accumulate capital and invest in the 
education of their children. The state itself was also controlled by white people and 
accumulated investment.120 
At the end of the 19th century, the period of land ownership as the basis of 
wealth accumulation was followed by the discovery of valuable natural resources.121 
The wealth gained through the exploitation of minerals was distributed to mostly 
whites. Diamonds and other minerals provided the foundation of the industrial revo-
lution in South Africa.122 Even though diamonds were not located in areas classified 
as white-owned, whites reaped the economic benefits of the extraction of such dia-
monds. Any claims to diamonds from miners of colour were disregarded by the Gov-
ernment of the Cape, aided by the colonial power. The natural resources of South Af-
rica were thus monopolized by whites and the profits derived from diamond mines 
went to this group. All the big players of the value chain, such as the De Beers Con-
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solidated Mines Ltd, were white-owned and supported by a white government and 
colonial power. De Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd, established in Kimberly, ran a 
monopoly at Colesberg Kopje, later, the Big Hole, at the end of the 1880s.123 Even 
skilled blacks with land qualifications were not powerful enough to counteract these 
racist developments.124 
Cecil Rhodes was prime minister of the Cape from 1890 to 1896 when these 
foundations on the accumulation of wealth from the country’s minerals were laid. He 
strengthened the British control on the accumulation of wealth from natural resources 
by building the railway from Cape Town to the valuable diamond areas.125 
In instances where minerals were found on private property, the landowner 
could sell the right to dig for gold to a mining company. However, the extraction 
process was controlled by the state which influenced the process through legisla-
tion.126 Land owners in areas where gold was found, in The Transvaal and The Free 
State, were white, in white-controlled political environments, and the capital to in-
vest and extract the mineral resources belonged to whites.127 The mining industry re-
cruited large numbers of male workers, mostly blacks and mostly from rural areas, 
also from other countries in Southern Africa.128 These migrant workers were sepa-
rated from their families and lived in poor conditions around the workplace, and sup-
ported their relatives who they were unable to live with. In contrast, white miners, 
through massive strikes, achieved working conditions which ensured their better-
ment. Their working conditions were superior and these workers never had to live in 
poorly equipped employer-owned settlements like the compounds, which housed 
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black workers.129 Compounds were dwellings where the mining companies accom-
modated recruited black workers. This maximized the control of the white-owned 
mining companies on black workers. Black workers fulfilled the demands of industry 
as a form of cheap labour.130 
In ‛most mines, the power of the state intersected with that of the compound man-
ager-‛the supreme dictatorʼ (...). Workers could not leave without a pass which ‛set 
forth the full names of the holder, his number, place of employment [and] period of 
absence allowed therebyʼ (...). Within the compounds, the regime of control rested 
on a bedrock of force and threat.’131 
This form of accommodation gave the employer tight control over most of the activi-
ties of black workers and separated them from the society in their area. It was not 
possible to live as a family in a compound. This separated the black workers from 
their families indefinitely, and no option of later moving their relatives to live with 
them existed. This manifestation of separation deepened their migrant status and was 
one of the barriers they faced to becoming an urban resident.132 
In addition there were differences between black and white people with re-
gard to access to education. The state did not provide education for black children. 
There were however, private, political, social and religious movements which acted 
together in providing schools that offered non-racial education. Prior to apartheid 
such institutions had already provided non-racial education and had been doing so 
since around 1850. Nonetheless, the majority of black children remained uneducated. 
The predominant social and political practice was that education, if offered to black 
children, was of a lower quality than the education offered to white children. Black 
education was focused on enabling them to perform simple jobs. The quality of edu-
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cation offered to black scholars in subjects like mathematics was by far lower than 
the quality for the white youth.133 There was also a lack of public investment in the 
education of educators of black schools and in the schools themselves.134 For more 
than a century, the focus was on the education and promotion of the dominant white 
group. To provide an example in the Orange Free State, compulsory education was 
introduced for white children in the 1890s, while for black children it was introduced 
more than a century later in 1994.135 In 1993, twenty percent of all South Africans 
over the age of 18 completed 12 years of school. While sixty one percent of the stu-
dents who completed their schooling were white only eleven percent of the pupils 
were black. 
This discriminatory legislative framework largely affected the accumulation 
of wealth by blacks and whites in South Africa, since the arrivals of the first Europe-
ans until the period of industrialisation in South Africa.136 
These social practices found their expression in legislation in isolated cases 
from 1841.137 The so-called ‘Master and Servant’ Act of 1926138 and the tax law 
from around 1900 are early examples of this kind of law.139 The Master and Servant 
Act was enacted in Natal and the Cape Province before the Union of 1910 and re-
mained in force and was developed after the Union of South Africa.140 Authors have 
expressed the view that the racially discriminatory laws were passed with the intent 
of preserving jobs for the white minority.141 It has been said that discrimination was 
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institutionalized since colonial times because blacks were not equated with white 
people.142 Apartheid, however, grew as an independent political system after the 
change-over to an industrial economy. 
The system was designed to preserve the master-servant relationship by giv-
ing the white minority greater economic status while systematically discriminating 
against the black majority.143 The apartheid government enacted a succession of laws 
designed to achieve its aims.144 Pre-apartheid and apartheid legislation that system-
atically discriminated against black people includes the legislation discussed below. 
The landownership of whites was protected by the Native Land Act of 
1913.145 Blacks were only allowed to own land in seven percent of the country.146 In 
addition, the buying of or leasing of property owned by a white person was prohib-
ited for blacks.147 This was a hurdle for black business development. This legislation 
largely hindered the right of the majority of South Africans to own land. The legisla-
tion was amended several times and certain areas designated for blacks only were 
declared independent from South Africa.148 However, in 1991, this legislation was 
repealed and the legal exclusion of the majority of South Africans from the right to 
own land finally ended.149 This legislation ensured that the majority of South Afri-
cans lived on a small portion of the land, while the minority lived on the bulk of the 
conquered land. The buying and renting rights of the majority were largely restricted. 
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The differentiation between skilled and unskilled workers according to the 
colour of their skin was ensured by workplace legislation.150 
The Mines and Works Act of 1911 introduced ʻthe first legal colour bar, protecting 
white workers (...) before the outbreak of the South African War, while a systematic 
list of jobs to be reserved for whites was negotiated by the skilled (all-white) trade 
unions as a condition of agreeing to the importation of Chinese labour to work in the 
mines in the aftermath of the war when the cutting of black wages had resulted in a 
major shortage of black labour (...). ... Job reservation on the mines, 'civilised labour' 
policy on the railways, pass law restrictions on mobility and a myriad of other laws 
and customs prevented black South Africans from gaining experience and higher in-
comes in an expanding industrial economy in the way that their white compatriots 
were able to do through the century.ʼ151 
Amendments such as the Mines and Works Amendment Act of 1926152 and the 
Mines and Works Amendment Act no 51 of 1959 ‛reinforced the colour bar in the 
mining industry’.
153
 This legislation was later repealed. 
The Apprenticeship Act of 1922154 proscribed people of colour, blacks in par-
ticular, from undertaking apprenticeships and becoming eligible and sufficiently 
qualified to undertake skilled or semi-skilled work.155 
The Factories, Machinery and Building Works Act of 1941156 and the Indus-
trial Conciliation Act of 1956157 which has been reinforced by its amendment in 
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1959158 empowered the Minister to make determinations in respect of the role ‛raceʼ 
could play in numerous areas of commercial life. 
‛As regards the ’principle of separate spheres of work for White and non-White em-
ployees’, Mr. Strydom159 explained that the Industrial Conciliation Amendment Act 
of 1959 was designed to stop Whites and Blacks from working together.’160 
The Act explicitly earmarked particular industrial jobs for specifically identified ra-
cial groups.161 The Act was repealed in 1995.162 
As previously discussed, the Green Paper on Employment and Occupational 
Equity (1996) provides that, in the past, occupational discrimination was evident 
within South African workplaces.163 The Green Paper notes that ‘[u]nder the apart-
heid system, a series of laws built discrimination into the political and social order of 
the day, entrenching it in all spheres of life, including the workplace.’164 During the 
apartheid era the South African government of the time created a discriminatory le-
gal framework. Numerous workplace laws were put into place to ensure that the 
privileged white minority reaped economic and social benefits in the South African 
Labour market.165  
Outside the labour market numerous crucial factors further perpetuated and 
strengthened inequality, such as, the inferior education and training received by the 
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black majority, inequalities in the possession of assets, the imbalanced division of 
domestic labour.166 
The exclusion of the majority from the urbanization process was, in addition 
to labour legislation, ensured through pass laws and the right of residence. The Na-
tive (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act of 1945167 prescribed that only a restricted 
number of blacks were permitted in urban areas, this restriction was limited to the 
number required for working purposes.168 The Group Areas Act of 1966169 restricted 
particular ’race’ groups to particular areas. ‘Race’ groups were confined to pre-
scribed areas and could only own and occupy land within the beaconed areas. The 
law additionally ‛resulted in people being removed by force’.170  
In the 1980s the Orange Free State introduced compulsory schooling for 
white children while the compulsory schooling for black children followed in 
1994.171 The Bantu Education Act of 1953,172 as aforementioned, legalized the sepa-
ration of the quality and class of education received by whites and non-whites. The 
Act ensured the legal entrenchment of inferior education for blacks. Blacks received 
inferior education that would only prepare them for the jobs deemed applicable for 
black persons. State subsidies for denominational schools were done away with and 
such educational institutions were closed down.173 The Extension of University Edu-
cation Act of 1959174 proscribed the attendance of black persons at white universi-
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ties, a few exceptions to this proscription, however, existed. Separate educational in-
stitutions were also established, through the act, for blacks, Indians and coloureds.175  
The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa of 1983176 created the tri-
cameral parliament from which blacks were excluded. Indians, coloureds and white 
people were represented in parliament while black persons had no such representa-
tion.177 Public policy was framed based on race and the white minority made deci-
sions and dictated to the other races.178 The white minority held the political and 
economic power enabling them to reap the benefits of the South African labour mar-
ket.179 
‘The subordination and exploitation of African subjects were achieved through their 
exclusion, not only from political citizenship, but also from most dimensions of so-
cial, economic and industrial citizenship. For white South Africans, but not the Afri-
can population, citizenship entailed a wide range of rights (as in the democracies of 
north-west Europe) rather than the highly discretionary privileges awarded by some 
Latin American states.’180,181 
It is evident from the discussion above that the wage inequalities present in the South 
African labour market today stem from long-standing historical discrimination that 
was further perpetuated and systematically institutionalized by apartheid laws. 
Though repealed, this legislation has greatly influenced the wage inequalities cur-
rently visible in the country’s labour market. 
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Additional elements underpinning the vertical wage gap in South Africa are 
the views and attitudes of society. The views and attitudes of employers still largely 
affect the manner in which their staff is remunerated. The influential role of views 
and attitudes as a source of the pay gap will be detailed below.  
2.3 Views and attitudes as a source of a pay gap 
Section 27 of the EEA was viewed by the government, headed by Nelson Mandela, 
as the solution to reducing the vertical pay gap, ‘but its efficiency will depend on 
both the extent to which employees, and society, can mobilise around its provi-
sions.’182 This statement underlines the connection between the legislation and social 
views and attitudes. As the legislative material indicates, the post-apartheid govern-
ment was well aware that the discriminatory legislation of the past played a huge role 
in the perpetuation of the vertical pay gap. 
Can it be assumed that with the advent of democracy the views and attitudes 
which caused the vertical pay gap are outdated and no longer held by society? In my 
view such an assumption would be misplaced. The broad majority of South Africans 
were in agreement that apartheid was unjust and wrong, but this does not mean that 
prejudicial views and attitudes were completely eliminated upon the advent of de-
mocracy. The vertical pay gap that exists today was largely caused by past legislation 
along with the views and attitudes of the past, which caused the undervaluation of 
‘typical black jobs.’ Looking at the figures of the ILO and World Bank it is clear that 
the distance between the top and the bottom incomes in South Africa are extensive. 
In the post-apartheid South Africa today one gets the impression that the wage gap is 
still growing and that no real progress towards its eradication has taken place. 
‘It is irresponsible and wrong to suggest that there is a ‘wage gap’ between the low-
est and highest pay levels in an enterprise. (...) Pay has to be aligned with the work 
done or contribution of each employee. It is unreasonable to expect enterprises to 
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‘reward’ employees for ‘inputs’ that do not add extra value. Unless a qualification or 
long service adds additional value, or there is a shortage of those skills in the market, 
there is no point in paying ‘premium’ wages to employees. This is the value ex-
change equation.’183 
This above opinion of Graham Giles is that the amount of pay is dictated by the mar-
ket (market-related). This view cannot be accepted. It is accepted that worldwide un-
skilled employees receive the lowest wages, and the author is right to hold that addi-
tional skills have to result in higher remuneration. However in South Africa the gap 
between the top and the bottom income earners is three times as high as in Brazil, the 
country with the second most disproportionate income levels. In light of the above 
quote, the author’s opinion suggests that there is much to be said about the views on 
income disparities within South Africa. Education, skills and expertise alone cannot 
be the sole criteria in assessing wages. Proportionality needs to be judged by looking 
comparative at the complete pay range within an establishment. Employers need to 
have a mindset in terms of which they acknowledge that wage disparities are not 
solely market-related and cannot merely be justified by employees` lack of formal 
education, skills and expertise. Proportionality remains essential. All over the world 
the lowest income levels apply to the unskilled. Market-related views do not refer to 
dignity, proportionality or individual contribution to value creation. In such a line of 
arguments exploitative low incomes can be dictated by the market. Because accord-
ing to this view the only relevant perspective is, what entrepreneurs may be willing 
to pay. 
‘Any premium paid must be earned by offering premium value. It is unfair and un-
reasonable to suppose that consumers will pay for the cost of unnecessary premium 
wages, or to assume that entrepreneurs will cut their return on investment.’184 
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The statement suggests that the current pay differentials are justified by the market 
and not caused by discriminatory practices inherited from the past. To pay the un-
skilled as little as they are paid today, and not more, is justified by the market and not 
an outcome of undervaluation that stems from the past. This view however cannot be 
accepted when one fully takes into account the vastly disproportionate income differ-
entials within South Africa. The vertical pay needs firstly to be acknowledged and 
then it needs to be addressed.  
‘Section 27 of the Employment Equity Act obliges employers to eliminate all dis-
proportionate pay differentials. Using the term ‘wage gap’ only confuses readers and 
has the danger of prolonging the stigma of outlawed past practices.’185 
One of the barriers to the implementation of section 27 of the EEA is the lack of con-
sensus in acknowledging the existence of the vertical pay gap and accepting that the 
pay structure in place today has been adopted from the apartheid era and is an out-
come of discriminatory practices. Views and attitudes of employers have largely 
caused unequal pay for work of equal value and led to the undervaluation of black 
jobs. During the legislative process the legislators pointed out that the income distri-
bution in South Africa shaped by the apartheid era is ‛unusually skew’.186  
Different social views and attitudes are a barrier to the implementation of pay 
scales, like those introduced by the German ERA, in South African companies. The 
implementation of the ERA took place after social views and attitudes on the differ-
entiation of blue and white collar workers had changed in Germany. In South Africa, 
however, section 27 of the EEA has been introduced where social views affecting the 
vertical wage gap still largely persist and can hinder any progressive steps taken to-
wards proportional income differentials.187 The collective agreements in Germany 
changed in response to a change in social views and attitudes. Social and legal condi-
tions have shaped the vertical pay gap in South Africa and social and legal norms are 
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the tool to reduce and ultimately remove the vertical pay gap. The differentiation be-
tween blue collar and white collar workers was an outdated concept in the German 
labour market. Differentiations based on race and education, however, still affect the 
South African labour market and this may play a influential role in preventing the ef-
fective implementation of collective agreements such as ERA in South Africa. 
There is reason to fear that a broad implementation of pay scales similar to 
the ERA in South Africa may be influenced by outdated views. In some cases during 
the implementation of the ERA in Germany the negative impact of outdated views on 
its implementation was observed. To prevent this from occurring, the insights of the 
research done on the inefficiency of the ERA agreements in the reduction of the gen-
der pay gap should be taken into account in implementing similar agreements in 
South Africa. If the parties involved are unaware that their prejudicial views and atti-
tudes can seep in during the implementation process of such agreements this can cre-
ate barriers to the effective implementation of such agreements. In order to ensure 
any measure of success in erasing long-standing disproportionate income differen-
tials the complete South African pay structure will require revision.  
In addition to this, developments in the global context add a further layer of 
complexity, it is thus important to take a more detailed look at the vertical pay gap in 
South Africa in global perspective. 
2.4. South Africa in global context 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, discriminatory social and legal norms lie at the heart of 
the wage gap between the bottom and the top levels of workers. Piketty states that 
income inequality between the highest and lowest income earners in South Africa, 
was and is, at least during periods where the data allow an analysis, at a level compa-
rable to or somewhat greater than the highest income inequality levels observed at 
specific times in wealthy countries in Europe and in the United States. 
 ‘Where the data allow, as in South Africa for certain sub periods, one finds that the 
highest observed levels for the top decile are on the order of 50–55 percent of na-
tional income — a level comparable to or slightly higher than the highest levels of 
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inequality observed in the wealthy countries, in Europe in 1900–1910 and in the 
United States in 2000–2010.’188 
The ILO Global Wage Report 2014/2015 shows that the gap between the top and the 
bottom work levels in South Africa is one of the highest in the world.189 The ILO 
measures ‘top to bottom’ income disparity by measuring the gap between the top and 
bottom deciles of income allocation using the so-called D9/D1 ratio and middle class 
inequality using the so-called D7/D3-ratio which measures the statistics of forty per-
cent of incomes in the middle of the income groups.190 This method identifies ten in-
come groups each indicative of the income of 10 per cent of the workers, starting 
with the uppermost 10 per cent of income recipients. 
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Figure 2: Evaluating disparity191 
The D9/D1-ratio determines how the ratio of the highest income of the lowest decile 
fits in the lowest income of the highest decile. The D9/D1-ratio for South Africa, in 
around 2012, was found to be 26.9192 meaning that if the highest income of the low-
est 10 percent is R 1 000,00 the lowest income of the highest 10 percent is R 26 
900,00. This is double the figures measured in the second worst country, being India, 
for which the figure is 12.2 and triple the figure for Brazil which is 8.4.193 
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The Global Wage Report 2014/2015 also showed that within the group of 
emerging countries ‘inequality increased … in South Africa, from a very high level 
inherited from the apartheid era.’194 
 
Figure 3: Top to bottom inequality (D9/D1-ratio) ILO Global Wage Report 2014/2015195 
Middle-class inequality in South Africa at a D7/D3-ratio of 3.7, around 2010–12, is 
greater than the top–bottom inequality in Iceland, Slovakia or the Czech Republic 
around the same time frame with a D9/D1-ratio of 3.6.196 This means that the frac-
tion between the highest and the bottommost income in the Czech Republic is as 
high as the difference in South Africa, solely within the middle class. The table be-
low indicates the unique large scale inequality within the middle class in South Af-
rica; this differs markedly from the middle class in other countries, where inequality 
is not as vast. 
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Figure 4: Middle class inequality (D7/D3-ratio) ILO Global Wage Report 2014/2015197 
The observed growth of the South African wage gap in the recent past is confirmed 
by the figures of the World Wealth and Income Database (WID).198 This data shows 
that the income share held by the top 5 percent of earners was around 30 percent in 
1990 to 1993, before the first democratic elections, and rose to around 40 percent in 
2008 to 2011.199 
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Figure 5: Income share held by the top 5 percent
Compared to the bottom share this means that the income share of the lower 95 pe
cent declined from 70 
Figure 6: Income distribution b
                                        
 
200
 Ibid. 
9,3
8,3
8,5
7,6
3,4
2,5
11,3
7,7
4,3 7,7
0%
Czech …
Germany
India
Indonisia
Brazil
South Africa
source: Worldbank, World Development Indicators, last updated: 09/09/2015, own calculation
Lowest quintile
second highest quintile
Proportionate Income Differentials
200
 
percent in the first time period to 60 percent in the second. 
y quintiles 
         
14,6
13,1
12,1
17,9
17,1
15,7
15,6
12,4
22,0
22,4
20,8
21,8
19,3
15,7
20% 40% 60% 80%
Income share by percentage  (figures from 2010 to 12) 
Income distribution by quintiles
second lowest quintile middle quintile
highest quintile
, p 49 of 186 
 
r-
 
 
36,2
39,1
42,8
43,7
57,2
69,9
100%
Proportionate Income Differentials, p 50 of 186 
 
 
The income figures of the World Bank for the income share held by lowest 10 per-
cent show the difference between South African and other emerging countries.201 In 
this category Brazil is, however, marginally worse than South Africa. The income 
share held by the lowest 10 percent is 1.0 percent in Brazil and 1.1 percent in South 
Africa.202 
 
Figure 7: Income share hold by the lowest ten percent - developing economies 
This statistics of the income share of the lowest decile may give one the impression 
that the wage disparities in South Africa are not as great as the disparities in other 
countries such as Brazil for example, however, the opposite can be said to be the 
case, as the ILO has shown with the D9/D1-ratio, 
‛[by] contrast [to other emerging and developing economies], in South Africa, the 
share of wages rises sharply among the three higher income groups, with social 
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transfers representing the largest share of income to those in the entire lower half of 
the distribution.’203 
If one looks at the statistics in greater detail, by observing the income portion held by 
the lower 60 percent of South Africans the real far-reaching extent of income dispari-
ties in the country become more visible.204 
 
Figure 8: Income share hold by the lowest sixty percent - developing economies 
When the income share of the lower income groups up to the lower 80 percent is in 
the global context extremely low205 the income share for the highest 10 percent is 
higher than somewhere else. In South Africa the national income concentrates 
stronger on the highest 10 percent than in nearly any other country in the world. 
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Figure 9: Income share hold by the highest ten percent - developing economies 
The gini coefficient is a method internationally used by the World Bank. 
 
Figure 10: Gini coefficient - developing economies 
A gini coefficient of 0 percentage (or 0.00) states that all members of a society share 
in the wealth and a gini coefficient of 100 percent (or 1.00) shows that the wealth is 
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only distributed to one person.206 In South Africa the gini coefficient is 65 percent 
which reveals a high level of disparity in wealth and income distribution. The gini 
coefficient in South Africa is remarkably higher than in all other regions of the 
world.207 
The ILO and WID data show the growth of the wage gap while the World 
Bank data shows the distribution of wages amongst South African income earners. 
Wage structures inherited from the apartheid era continue to persist.208 Research fig-
ures of the WID reveal that the end of apartheid did not result in a reduction of the 
vertical pay gap.209 The income share of the top 5 percent of income holders has even 
increased from 29.27 percent in 1990 to 38.90 percent in 2011.210 There may be vari-
ous reasons for this increase; one such reason being that with the end of apartheid 
came the lifting of the trade ban on South Africa which resulted in great economic 
advantages for business and tourism. The additional value may not have reached the 
lower income groups. Wittenberg comments that 
‛Earnings have improved rapidly for high incomes, while they have been stagnant at 
the median, leading to a growing gap between the top and the middle of the income 
distribution. Nevertheless, South Africa is also different given the fact that there 
were strong expectations of more redistributive outcomes following the collapse of 
Apartheid in 1994. Unlike many other countries the policy stance was not hostile to 
unions.’211 
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In global comparison it is clear that wage disparities in South Africa are quite exten-
sive. Where legal measurers to address the vertical pay gap already exist, they have 
to be given effect through practical implementation. The current legal framework in 
South Africa dealing with wage inequalities will be explored and analyzed more ex-
pansively underneath. 
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3. Analysis of the current legal framework in South Africa 
3.1. Legal methodologies to address inequality 
The South African legal framework addressing workplace inequality is quite exten-
sively regulated by means of legislation. Such legislation includes the EEA and the 
PEPUDA which facilitates the constitutional right to equality.212 
The remaining issue is, however, that while such an extensive legislative 
framework for workplace equality does exist, there is a lack of implementation. Fur-
thermore, the effectiveness of legislative provisions is largely dependent on the na-
ture of a provision and its approach to addressing inequality. This is evident when 
one assesses reactive and proactive provisions.213 The provisions of the EEA can be 
differentiated as reactive and proactive measures. 
A reactive provision provides an individual with the right to claim based on 
infringement. Such a provision, for example, provides an employee with the right to 
defend him/herself in the instance of an unfair dismissal. Fredman remarks that 
Such ‛procedures are in principle limited: they leave the initiative to the individual 
victim, and only address discrimination where there is an identifiable perpetrator 
who can be proved to have breached the law.ʼ214 
Such provisions have been described as complaints-led models.215 
Reactive provisions work in the following way: the provision defines who 
may take legal action against discrimination and sets out what needs to be proven for 
a successful claim against unfair discrimination. Reactive provisions are thus largely 
reliant on individual action being taken against unfair discrimination. The provision 
                                                 
 
212
 Preamble of the EEA; preamble of the PEPUDA. 
213
 Schiek, Dagmar & Busch, Sebastian Proaktiver Schutz vor (rassistischer) Diskriminierung im Ar-
beitsrecht - lernen von Südafrika? Hans-Böckler-Stiftung, Arbeitspapier 84 (2004) 11. 
214
 Fredman, Sandra ‛Making equality effective: The Role of Proactive Measuresʼ University of Ox-
ford Legal Research Paper Series Paper 53/2010, 11. 
215
 Ibid. 
Proportionate Income Differentials, p 56 of 186 
 
 
gives the individual the right to take legal action against unfair discrimination. Reac-
tive provisions addresses unfair discrimination in retrospect.216 
Reactive provisions can prove highly effective in instances where an action 
reliant on such a provision is instituted against the state or a large public company, as 
it can result in a widespread change in practices. 
The possibility of such a positive effect is largely dependent on the circum-
stances of each case. This is indicative from the case law discussed below. 
Cases like Hoffmann v South African Airways217 or Independent Municipal 
and Allied Trade Union and Another v City of Cape Town218 have been successfully 
based on individual rights to equality. Hoffmann filed a successful claim of discrimi-
nation against South African Airways’ based on their former practice not to employ 
people living with HIV as cabin attendants.219 Due to South African Airways being a 
publicly-owned, internationally-known company it was more strongly compelled by 
a Constitutional Court ruling to change its general practices on the employment of 
people living with HIV. 
In the case of Independent Municipal and Allied Trade Union and Another v 
City of Cape Town the Independent Municipal and Allied Trade Union successfully 
appealed together with Mr Murdoch against the practice of the City of Cape Town of 
not employing insulin dependent diabetics as fire fighters.220 In the cases discussed 
above two elements came together; the ruling on a violation of equality resulted in 
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remedying the predicament for the individual, and it also set a precedent for future 
equality violations of this sort. 
These individual actions had widespread appeal because they were instituted 
against public institutions. A public institution or well-known company will not, or at 
the very least is less likely to repeat an discriminatory practice. Reactive provisions 
can thus prove highly successful in such circumstances. There are, however, circum-
stances in which such provisions may prove to be less successful. In instances in-
volving private companies and smaller institutions such provisions may have less of 
a deterrent effect. 
Furthermore, it is important to note that reactive provisions always require 
that individuals become actively involved in abolishing discriminatory practices. In 
order for such provisions to provide results an individual claimant has to come for-
ward, allege unfair discrimination and take legal action against such discrimination. 
This may prove daunting for some individuals who may not want to be active in 
fighting against discriminatory practices and in many instances may have good rea-
sons for not wanting to do so. Such reasons may include, but are not limited to, the 
costliness of legal proceedings, the fact that they are time consuming and that it may 
be intimidating for an individual to take on a corporation. Many individuals have 
also come to accept that discrimination in the workplace exists. They may be un-
aware and/or unsure of their legal rights and how to address unfair workplace dis-
crimination. The individualistic nature of reactive provisions can, in fact, largely 
hinder the usefulness and success of such provisions. In contrast, proactive measures 
move away from an individualistic approach and may, therefore, prove more effec-
tive. 
Proactive measures are legislative provisions that systematically redress ine-
qualities. These provisions call for proactive means of eliminating disparities. Proac-
tive provisions are centred on the complete removal of discriminatory practices and 
aim at improving the situation for all. These provisions are not individualised in na-
ture but have a more general wider-reaching effect. Proactive equality legislation 
needs a defined objective and guiding principles to follow.  
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An example of a proactive measure is a quota law which provides for greater 
representation of women. The effect such a law is applicable to all corporations and 
must be implemented accordingly. Where such a legislation is established, compa-
nies are obliged to fulfil the quota whether or not they have previously been respon-
sible for or contributed to the under representation of women within their sectors. 
Such provisions are not centred on the infringement of an individual right and the 
discrimination need not be individually litigated against to ensure its eradication. 
Proactive provisions are a reactional development to discrimination as a whole 
within society. 221 
In many instances the effective implementation of such provisions is not be-
ing carried out, or the correct and proper implementation of such provisions is inef-
fectively monitored. Section 27 of the EEA is a prime example of a well-drafted pro-
active measure, with great potential for the widespread removal of vertical wage dis-
parities. In the discussion below section 27 and its potential for eradicating income 
disproportionality will be evaluated in greater detail. 
3.2. Section 27 of the EEA  
Section 27 of the EEA was implemented to address disproportionate vertical income 
differentials.222 The requirements of section 27 of the EEA are aimed at reducing 
disproportionate income differentials between occupational categories and levels.223 
The provision, if correctly implemented and monitored, can have the positive effect 
of decreasing unfair income differentials between occupational levels. 
The provision calls for every designated employer to submit a statement on 
the ʻremuneration and benefits received in each occupational level of that employer's 
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workforceʼ.224 This provision provides that if and when income differentials are pro-
portionate it needs to be carefully examined by analysing the difference in income of 
the top and the bottom levels of the workforce. Where income differentials are dis-
proportionate or unfair discrimination exists in the form of a difference in terms and 
conditions of employment, a designated employer must take measures to progres-
sively reduce such differentials. 
The provision is aimed at eradicating vertical inequality, unlike with horizon-
tal equality; the elimination of vertical income discrimination does not lead to equal 
wages for all employees. It merely means that proportionate wage differentials 
should result in fair pay gaps between different occupational levels. This provision 
thus holds out the prospect of creating a more proportionate wage-earning system for 
all wage earners in South Africa. The EEA made the progressive elimination of ver-
tical income discrimination within the workplace an affirmative action measure.225 
Section 27 of the EEA is, therefore, not individualistic in nature but is aimed at 
eradicating vertical wage inequalities for all wage earners in South Africa; the provi-
sion is proactive in nature. 
The provision involves numerous role players, calling for them to become ac-
tively involved in abolishing vertical wage discrimination in South Africa. The pro-
vision provides that the minister may give guidance to employers on measures to 
progressively reduce income differentials. The powers ‛exercised by the Minister in 
this regard are of a socio-economic nature and should be exercised with great cir-
cumspection, taking into account not merely the interests of so-called disadvantaged 
groups, but also the effect on economic growth and the interests of the employer’.226 
Whether the Minister provides guidance in terms of section 27 of the EEA, or not 
employers have to fulfil their duty to reduce wage differentials. Section 27(4) proac-
                                                 
 
224
 Section 27 (1) of the EEA. 
225
 Chapter III of the EEA. 
226
 Niekerk et al (2012), 166. 
Proportionate Income Differentials, p 60 of 186 
 
 
tively calls for the ECC to ‛research and investigate norms and benchmarks for pro-
portionate income differentials’.227  
The provision also envisages collective bargaining and provides for the pro-
active involvement of bargaining parties. The exact extent of proportionality in terms 
of section 27 (4) of the EEA can be set by the ECC or through collective bargaining 
or by the bargaining partners. Bargaining partners do not have to wait for the ECC 
and have the right to draft their own criteria.228 Trade unions and employer organiza-
tions have the right to structure labour relationships by collective agreement, once 
norms and benchmarks have been set by such a collective agreement.229 Through 
providing for collective bargaining, the provision envisages that the steps towards the 
eradication of disproportionate income differentials must be designed with a sense of 
proportion in mind. 
Section 27 (2) of the EEA has the potential to be an effective instrument in 
the reduction of disproportionate income differentials. The provision has the poten-
tial to result in the creation of norms and benchmarks to achieve proportionate in-
come differentials. In theory, it is a well constructed proactive measure, as proactive 
legislation needs reference values or a reference framework, in other words ‛norms 
and benchmarks,’230 to become effective.  
While section 27 of the EEA provides a useful framework for the proactive 
realization of proportionate income differentials, norms and benchmarks for propor-
tionate wage differentials have not been established since the enactment of the EEA 
in 1998. Measures to reduce disproportionate wage differentials are required and 
cannot be postponed until the ECC eventually creates norms and benchmarks for the 
reduction of wage differentials or until the Minister provides guidance in this respect. 
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Without effective implementation section 27 of the EEA, although proactive in na-
ture, cannot achieve its practical aims and will remain functional only in theory.  
The above discussion of reactive and proactive legislative provisions in our 
workplace law makes it evident that, while there are legislative means for addressing 
workplace inequality, their effectiveness is still largely dependent on implementa-
tion, monitoring, and the nature of a provision, namely its effectiveness in the given 
circumstances.  
In order to realize the eradication of wage proportionalities in South Africa 
section 27 of the EEA has to be successfully implemented. The great difficulty in re-
alizing this legislative provision, therefore, lies in finding the best means of effective 
implementation. The discussion to follow assesses the German approach to reducing 
wage inequalities and how this may provide a useful model for the implementation of 
section 27 of the EEA. 
In a similar manner to how income differentiations based on ‘race’ caused the 
vertical wage gap in South Africa, the differentiation of blue and white collar work-
ers in Germany resulted in wage inequalities, this resulted in the implementation of 
the ERA.231 The ERA was introduced as a measure of reducing wage inequalities in 
the metal and electrical industry in Germany. The genesis of the ERA and its context 
and development will be evaluated and detailed in chapter 4. 
3.3 Proportionality 
Proportionality has become a foundational element of global constitutionalism.232 
Proportionality takes into account that limitations and intrusions must not be arbi-
trary, but proportional.233 The concept of proportionality looks at reasonableness, ra-
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tionality, fairness and public interest.234 Rautenbach defines proportionality as fol-
lows: 
‘‘proportion’’ is ‘‘due relation of one thing to another or between parts of a thing’ 
and (in a mathematical sense) the ‘equality of ratios between two pairs of quantities’; 
‘proportionality’ means ‘in due proportion, corresponding in degree or amount’.’235 
ʻProportionality becomes a tool to enhance accountability and justification for gov-
ernmental actionʼ 236 
Globally, the tests of proportionality take different forms, but ultimately the differing 
tests are aimed at achieving the same purpose.  
Klatt and Meister describe the four-prong structure of proportionality in Germany as 
follows: ʻthe first stage examines whether the act pursues a legitimate aim, suitabil-
ity, whether the act is capable of achieving its aim, necessity, whether the act impairs 
the right as little as possible, the balancing stage, whether the act represents a net 
gain, when the reduction on enjoyment of rights is weighed against the level of reali-
zation of the aim.ʼ237 
The Canadian test for proportionality takes into account; the relationship between the 
measure adopted and the aim it serves to achieve, the measure must be rationally 
connected to the justifiable objective, the measure must be the least harmful and 
there must be a relation between the harm caused and the importance of the objective 
of the measure.238 
In South Africa proportionality entails assessing whether the measure is 
aimed at achieving a legitimate purpose, whether the measure is rationally connected 
to its purpose, whether less restrictive means for achieving the same purpose exist 
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and whether the measure is proportional taking into account the nature of the meas-
ure, the breadth of the limitation and the social good it achieves (a balancing of inter-
ests).239 Section 36 of the Constitution states ‛that a right in the bill of rights’, like 
section 9 of the Constitution, ‛may be limited only in terms of law of general applica-
tion to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and de-
mocratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom taking into account 
all relevant factors, including’240 specifically named factors in the provision. 
In the case of S v Makwanyane the court in assessing whether the limitation 
of a fundamental right was fair and justifiable held as follows: 
‛The limitation of constitutional rights for a purpose that is reasonable and necessary 
– involves the weighing up of competing values and ultimately an assessment of 
proportionality.’241 
The court held that the elements of proportionality namely; reasonableness, justifi-
ableness, fairness and necessity are considerations that need to be taken into account 
in the balancing process.242 
The concept of proportionality has a vital role to play in the context of section 
27 of the EEA. The wording of section 27 of the EEA makes it clear that norms and 
benchmarks need to be set for income differentials between occupational levels that 
are aimed at achieving proportionality.243 In order to determine how such norms and 
benchmarks should look, it is important to understand proportionality as applicable 
to section 27 of the EEA. The constitutional test for proportionality discussed above, 
when applied in the context of section 27 of the EEA will require taking into account 
the following; the nature of the norms and benchmarks set, the importance of the 
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purpose of such norms and benchmarks, the nature and extent to which such norms 
and benchmarks limits the rights or interests of role players, the relationship between 
the norms and benchmarks and their purpose (namely proportionate income differen-
tials) and lastly whether its purposes could be achieved through the use of less re-
strictive means. Below we will explore some of these elements in greater detail. 
The rationality test of proportionality can be applied to section 27 of the EEA 
in the following manner: the employer’s justifiable objective is to achieve propor-
tional income differentials. To ensure rationality it is important that the workplace 
standard is reasonably necessary to accomplish the employer’s purpose, a connection 
between the standard and purpose must exist.244 This test concerns the relationship 
between the measure and its aims.245 The employer will aim to assign the highest in-
come to the most competent and experienced employees and for this purpose the em-
ployee develops workplace standards (norms and benchmarks) for wage determina-
tions.246 The norms and benchmarks set for proportionality in terms of section 27 
must be driven by the legitimate aim of assigning income in accordance with experi-
ence, education, responsibility, skill, competence and expertise. The norms and 
benchmarks for achieving this aim should be related to their aim, for example, the 
norms and benchmarks can classify employees into income groups according to their 
years of experience, degree of education, level of skill, competency in performing 
their tasks and expertise in the field. The norms and benchmarks determining the in-
come groups cannot be completely unrelated to the aim of proportional income dif-
ferentials. To ensure rationality the income for an occupational level needs to be 
connected to the work performed. 
The norms and benchmarks set, must be confined to the core aim / target of 
such norms and benchmarks. These standards must be capable of achieving the aim 
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for which they have been designed. This has to be done without placing an undue 
burden on the employees to whom they apply to assess whether the burden placed on 
the employees can be considered undue less restrictive means need to be explored.247 
To achieve proportionality, less restrictive measures for achieving the same 
purpose have to be investigated and the ‛least intrusive meansʼ should be applied. In 
light of norms and benchmarks for achieving proportional income differentials it is 
important that the employer/commission/bargaining body investigates alternative 
standards or approaches, such as for example more individually sensitive standards. 
248If alternative standards are investigated and found to be capable of achieving the 
same aim as the decided norms and benchmarks it is important for the role players of 
section 27 to provide sufficient explanation for why they were not implemented.249 
Assessing whether it’s necessary to have all employees within an occupational level 
meet the same standard or whether standards that are reflective of individuals or of 
particular groups of individuals is an important aspect of exploring less restrictive 
means.  
In the case of S v Makanwanye, the court held that an open society based on 
freedom and equality, means that there is no absolute standard which can be laid 
down for determining reasonableness and necessity. Principles can be established, 
but the application of those principles to particular circumstances needs to be done 
on a case by case basis.250 
Based on the above it is clear that in order for norms and benchmarks in the 
context of section 27 of the EEA to achieve proportionality, such norms and bench-
marks should be capable of being applied on a case by case basis. The norms and 
benchmarks for determining proportional income differentials need to be guiding 
principles that can be applied to specific circumstances. Such norms and benchmarks 
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need to be capable of being evaluated and applied in a manner that fully takes into 
account the individual circumstances of each employee accounting for their level of 
education, skill, years of experience and any other elements that should rightly affect 
their income.251 Rigid standards that overlook the individual circumstances of an 
employee cannot attain proportionality. The standards need to be adaptable to em-
ployees who are suitably qualified. An employee may, for example, lack formal edu-
cation but have years of experience, expertise and practical skills. These aspects can-
not be overlooked as a result of rigid, inflexible norms and benchmarks being set.  
In addition, it is important to note that norms and benchmarks for income dif-
ferentials that are capable of realizing proportionality will still differentiate between 
occupational levels. It is therefore not required for proportionality that there be no 
differentiation whatsoever. It is merely of importance that such a differentiation does 
not amount to unfair discrimination and that the differentiation is rationally con-
nected to its purpose. It is inevitable that there will be a difference in income be-
tween occupational levels; this is because the occupational levels perform different 
work and the employees falling within the different occupational categories have dif-
ferent levels of skill, education, expertise and experience. Nonetheless, the income 
differentiation between the occupational categories, supported by the norms and 
benchmarks to be set in accordance with section 27 of the EEA must not be arbitrary, 
but must be rationally connected to their aim of attaining proportionality. In taking 
into account the constitutional understanding of proportionality this would entail that 
such norms and benchmarks must be reasonable, fair, justifiable and necessary and 
they need to balance the interests of the employer and employee as well as that of the 
employee and other workers. The norms and benchmarks set need to weigh up com-
peting values of all the role players involved to achieve proportionality. 
Ultimately, in order for the norms and benchmarks to achieve proportionality, 
they should take into account the balancing of competing rights and values. Alterna-
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tives and various ways in which individual capabilities may be assessed should be 
looked at. The skills, capabilities and potential contributions of the individual claim-
ant and others like him must be respected. Balancing the interests and rights of the 
employee and employer, as well as taking into account the interests of the employee 
in relation to those of other workers.252 Proportionality ultimately comes down to ra-
tionality, fairness, reasonableness, justifiableness and necessity. 
3.4 When are vertical income differentials proportionate? 
The legislative process has shown that section 27 of the EEA was implemented to 
address disproportionate vertical income differentials.253 Norms and benchmarks for 
proportionate wage differentials have, however, not been established since the en-
actment of the EEA in 1998. Unlike with horizontal equality, the elimination of ver-
tical income discrimination does not lead to equal wages for all employees. It merely 
means that proportionate wage differentials should result in fair pay gaps between 
different occupational levels. In recognition of this, section 27 (4) of the EEA states, 
that the ECC ‛must research and investigate norms and benchmarks for proportionate 
income differentials’.254 The EEA made the progressive elimination of vertical in-
come discrimination an affirmative action measure.255  
It is stated that the requirements of section 27 of the EEA ‛are controversial’, 
since their ‛aim is to reduce disproportionate income differentials between occupa-
tional categories and levels’.256 
There is no longer any legal justification in allowing the injustices of apart-
heid to persist, both national and international equality law prohibit it. Allowing the 
unjust income differentiations of the past would violate section 1 (a), (b) and (c), as 
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well as section 9 and section 23 (1) of the Constitution. Section 1 of the Constitution 
states in subsections (a) and (b) that, South Africa is built on the values of human 
dignity, the achievement of equality and non-racialism and non-sexism. The inher-
ited vertical wage gap is an outcome of racist views and attitudes. In section 1 (c) the 
Constitution emphasised that South Africa is built on the values of the supremacy of 
the constitution and the rule of law. In s 9 of the Constitution it guarantees substan-
tial equality and in section 23 (1) the right to fair labour practices. Not to reduce the 
vertical wage gap would prolong this apartheid injustice and breach the principle of 
the achievement of equality, non-racialism, substantial equality and fair labour prac-
tices. Discriminatory practices cannot be classified as non-racist, substantially equal 
or fair. Not to implement section 27 EEA is a violation of the principle of the rule of 
law.  
3.5 The potential of section 27 EEA 
Section 27 (2) of the EEA has the potential to be an effective instrument in the reduc-
tion of disproportionate income differentials. 
‘The section was extremely controversial when introduced into the Act. One can see 
why; its potential for impacting on wage rates is considerable.’257 
The provision has the potential to result in the creation of norms and benchmarks to 
achieve proportionate income differentials. 
This view on the potential of section 27 of the EEA is backed by the 
‛Recommendations on Policy and Implementation of the National Minimum Wage 
Panel’. In November 2016 the National Minimum Wage Panel stated in their report 
that ‛more consideration should be given to Section 27 of the Employment Equity 
Act (EEA), which would regulate the observed ratio between the top 5% and bottom 
5% of earners in all companies and institutions.’ Voluntary steps might not be 
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enough and ‛a regulated system could be considered that creates effective wage ceil-
ings to reduce wage inequality.’258 
The EEA 4 form is the form for the statement in terms of section 27 (1) of the 
EEA. The legal imperative of section 27 of the EEA is most clearly demonstrated in 
the 1999 EEA 4 A form.259 The employer was, in section D of the form, only re-
quired to report the five highest and the five lowest incomes of his employees. The 
information was in essence reduced. 
Section 27 (1) of the EEA requires that the EEA 4 form is regularly submitted 
to show any progress in addressing the vertical wage gap. In 1999 an EEA 4 form for 
enterprises with 150 workers or more was introduced, the form had four sections to 
be answered, namely: 
A: Employer details  
B: Income differentials per occupational category  
C: Income differentials per occupational level 
D: Total income differentials260 (between top and bottom levels). 
Smaller companies had to fill out the form limited to chapter A and D. Chapter D 
was the same in the forms for both smaller and larger companies and is a clear indi-
cation of the intention of the legislature. 
Income Differential Statement 1999261 
EEA 4 and EEA 4A form 
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Figure 11: The original EEA 4 and EEA 4A form262 
The document requires the employer to supply the five highest incomes within a 
company and the five lowest.  
‛In completing the Income Levels, the first income level (1) represents the average 
equivalent yearly remuneration and benefits of the five highest-paid employees. The 
second income level (2) represents the average equivalent yearly remuneration and 
benefits of the five lowest-paid employees.’263 
Since 2006 changes to the EEA 4 form have been introduced. In other respects these 
changes may have a positive impact. In respect of section 27 of the EEA, however, 
these changes have complicated the implementation process. When one looks at the 
original EEA 4 form its purpose is quite clear. In companies with up to 150 employ-
ees nothing more than the income differentials of the average of the five highest and 
the five lowest earnings was required; this is the gap between the top and the bottom. 
The original EEA 4 form was highly focussed on the vertical wage gap. The 
EEA 4 form has the potential to aid identifying income differentials in companies 
which affect the very least starting point. Perhaps the introduction of two forms may 
promote the implementation of section 27 of the EEA. The current EEA 4 form could 
be divided into two forms. One form may comply with the original EEA 4 form; the 
second may include the further particulars which have been added to the original 
EEA 4 form. This may help to pay closer attention to the main objective of section 
                                                 
 
262
 Ibid. 
263
 Instructions, Regulations Employment Equity Act 1999, EEA 4A and EEA 4A form 1999. 
Proportionate Income Differentials, p 71 of 186 
 
 
27 of the EEA, namely the overcoming of disproportionate vertical income differen-
tials. 
3.6 The Louw case: The need for criteria for job evaluation.  
In Louw vs Golden Arrow264 the Labour Court discussed disproportionate income 
differentials between different occupational levels as a discriminatory practice.265 
The case arose before the introduction of section 27 into the Employment Equity 
Act. Mr Louw’s claim was a claim for discrimination on the grounds of ʻraceʼ colour 
or ethnic origin, he claimed that as a result of these grounds Golden Arrow paid him 
less than a white comparator who performs work of equal value, alternatively he al-
leged that the difference in their salaries was disproportionate in the difference of the 
value of their jobs.266 Golden Arrow acknowledged the wage differentials between 
the salaries of the two men, but held that it was justified in that the work performed 
was not of equal value. Golden Arrow held that the wage between the two employees 
was based on a number of reasons, none of which were discriminatory.267 The court 
calculated the income of Mr Louw as 58, 9 percent of the salary of his co-worker.268 
Mr Louw’s case was unsuccessful on the grounds that he could not prove that 
he and his co-worker performed work of equal value. The court set the burden of 
proof and standard of evidence too high for Louw to fulfil. The court placed the duty 
on him to prove causation between the differentials in pay and the discriminatory 
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grounds he relied on, by requiring him to prove that ‛his salary is less than Mr 
Beneke’s salary because of his race.ʼ269 
Louw further alleged that the disproportional income between him and his co-
worker amounted to unfair labour practice. The court found that disproportionality in 
the incomes ascribed to the two men was not proven. Nevertheless, the court agreed 
that disproportionate pay differentials can be discriminatory. In 2009 in the decision 
of Mangena v Fila the Labour Court confirmed that the formulation taken in Louw v 
Golden Arrow places a significant burden on an applicant in a claim for equal pay.270 
This case clearly points out how essential it is that there be objective criteria 
in place to determine work of equal value. It also emphasises how important it is to 
establish criteria for determining proportional income between occupational levels. 
Setting such criteria ensures that an undue burden is not placed on an individual 
claiming equal pay or a proportionate share of income. The Louw case did not have 
the benefit of section 27 of the EEA, the Regulations on the EEA (hereinafter: the 
Regulations), the Code of the Good Practice on the Integration of Employment Eq-
uity into Human Resource Policies and Practices271 (hereinafter: the HR Code) the 
Code of Good Practice on Equal Pay/Remuneration for Work of Equal Value272 
(hereinafter: the EP Code) having begun prior to their introduction. Thus the decision 
emphasises the important role that these legislative tools hold in eliminating horizon-
tal and vertical income differentials in South Africa and these tools will be discussed 
below. 
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3.7 The EP Code, the HR Code and the Regulations. 
The EP Code is a progressive recent legislative step taken in eliminating dispropor-
tionate income differentials within South Africa. It should be noted, that as its title 
suggests the sole function of the EP Code is to promote equal pay for work of equal 
value. The EP Code offers a strong tool to eradicate income differentials within an 
occupational level and does not go so far as to assist in the elimination of wage dis-
parities between occupational levels. Although the EP Code acknowledges the un-
dervaluation of work, it leaves the crucial element of income proportionality between 
occupational levels, untouched. 
‛The objective of this [EP] Code is to provide practical guidance to employers and 
employees on how to apply the principle of equal pay/remuneration for work of 
equal value in their workplaces.’273 
Vertical income proportionality is the sole purpose of section 27 of the EEA. The 
provision's objective is to reduce discriminatory wage differentials by creating pro-
portional income differentials between occupational levels. Section 3.8 of the EP 
Code mentions section 27 of the EEA by providing that: 
‛Section 27 of the Act requires designated employers to report on the pay / remu-
neration and benefits received by employees in each occupational level of their 
workforce, and where there are disproportionate income differentials or unfair dis-
crimination by virtue of a difference in terms and conditions of employment, em-
ployers must take steps to progressively reduce these differentials. Guidance in this 
regard is provided for in the Code of Good Practice on the Integration of Employ-
ment Equity into Human Resources Policies, Practices and Procedures (HR 
Code).ʼ274 
In so far as guidance in reducing vertical income differentials between occupational 
levels, section 3.8 of the EP Code points us in the direction of the HR Code. The HR 
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Code is a useful aid for employers in reducing discriminatory wage disparities be-
tween occupational levels, and a much needed starting point for the implementation 
of section 27 of the EEA.  
Section 6 of the HR Code is of significant importance to this discussion. The 
provision provides for job analysis and job descriptions and states that a job descrip-
tion consists of two components; a description of the outputs of the job and a descrip-
tion of the inputs of the job. These two components will be detailed below. Section 
6.1.1.2 provides 
A ‛description of the outputs of the job (what the job proposes to do). This descrip-
tion should provide an accurate and current picture of what functions make up a job, 
and should not include unrelated tasks,. This should outline the job’s location, pur-
pose, responsibilities, authority levels, supervisory levels and interrelationships be-
tween the job and others in the same area.ʼ275 
A ‛description of the inputs of the job (i.e. what the person doing the job is required 
to do). This description should provide details about the knowledge, experience, 
qualifications, skills and attributes required to perform the job effectively.ʼ276 
The above provisions can be used as tools in creating proportional income differen-
tials between occupational levels. The provisions ensure that jobs are categorised by 
not only taking fully the responsibilities but also considering the relation to other oc-
cupational categories within the same industry. In addition this aids in ensuring that 
jobs are ascribed an income according to the skill, education, expertise and experi-
ence required. This places jobs within a hierarchy and enables one to assess fully the 
income differentials between occupational categories within an industry and helps 
one assess to which extent such differentials are justifiable. 
An additional element of significance of Section 6 of the HR Code is that the 
provision places responsibility on employers to conduct a job analysis when develop-
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ing a job description. Employers are required to fully assess the job, looking at it in 
its entirety by assessing the specific tasks, functions, processes, operations, elements 
of the job and using clear language277 to avoid misinterpretation. In this way jobs are 
less likely to be undervalued. 
The EP Code describes four criteria that are up to date and relevant for the 
evaluation of jobs. These criteria are (1) the responsibility demanded of the work, in-
cluding responsibility for people finances and material,278 (2) skills qualifications in-
cluding prior learning whether formal or informal279, (3) physical, mental and emo-
tional effort required in performing the work280 and (4) physical environment, psy-
chological conditions, time ‛whenʼ and geographic location ‛whereʼ the work is per-
formed281. These criteria are useful objective aids that enable one to assess jobs in re-
lation to comparable jobs or jobs with a comparable work load, and to determine to 
what extent income differentials between workers within an occupational level are 
justifiable. 
The Geneva Evaluation System from 1950282 
 
Skills Stress 
1. Intellectual Requirements X X 
2. Physical requirements X X 
3. Responsibility  X 
4. Environmental factors  X 
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Figure 12: The Geneva Evaluation System from 1950 
The four criteria of 5.4 of the EP Code reflects those of the Geneva Evaluation Sys-
tem which were introduced in 1950. 
The criteria are also in line with article 3 of the ILO Equal Remuneration 
Convention, 1951 (no 100) which calls for the elimination of disproportionate in-
come differentials between men and women. It is interesting to note that the ILO 
Convention no 100 was published by the ILO, based in Geneva, just one year subse-
quent to the introduction of the Geneva Evaluation System in 1950. The EP Code 
also, in fact, refers to the ILO Convention no 100.283 
The Employment Equity Regulations provide the necessary tools to collect 
data on the income structure in particular with the EEA 4 form. These data allow an 
in-depth view on the current pay structure of an enterprise as well as its development 
throughout the recent past. 
The HR and the ER Code provide the theoretical foundation for the develop-
ment of a non discriminatory proportionate target pay structure. The Regulations 
provide for the collection of data through which a comparison between the current 
pay structure and the target pay structure can be achieved. However, while these 
three provisions can be a starting point for the practical implementation on enterprise 
level, more detailed objective criteria needs to be developed in order to address dis-
proportionate income differentials. In this regard the answer for employers and em-
ployees alike may still lie in collective bargaining. Collective bargaining is after all a 
tool expressly mentioned by the legislature in section 27 of the EEA, and collective 
agreements may greatly assist through providing even more detailed objective crite-
ria for job valuations. 
An example of collective agreements objective criteria for the evaluation of 
the various jobs in a industry are the ERA agreements which were introduced in the 
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different regions of German metal and electrical industry between 2003 and 2009. 
The founding principles of the ERA collective agreements are based on the Geneva 
Evaluation System of 1950 and its continued scientific development. The detailed 
nature of ERA, describing pay grades, pay categories and pay elements has made in-
roads towards the eradication of disproportionate income differentials between white 
and blue collar workers. A closer look at ERA and in particular at the ERA collective 
agreement in Baden-Wurttemberg may provide useful guidance in the implementa-
tion of section 27 of the EEA and will be discussed in detail below. 
3.8 The link to ERA 
Similar to the fact that income differentiations based on ‘race’ caused the vertical 
wage gap in South Africa, the differentiation of blue and white collar workers in 
Germany resulted in wage inequalities, as mentioned above. This resulted in the im-
plementation of ERA.284 The genesis of ERA will be set out and discussed below. 
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4. The ERA Agreement: context and development 
4.1 The genesis of the ERA Agreement 
In the German metal and electrical industry there was traditionally a distinct income 
differentiation between blue and white collar workers. As the lines between blue and 
white collar work became blurred, a measure had to be introduced for proportionate 
income differentials which led to the introduction of ERA. 
One can trace back the privileged treatment of commercial white collar work-
ers to the late 1800’s; this preferential treatment has been described as discrimina-
tory. White collar workers received greater remuneration and enjoyed better em-
ployment and working conditions than blue collar workers. Commercial white collar 
workers were referred to as the officials of the employer.285 This was so because they 
were not remunerated according to their work performance, instead their loyalty to 
the employer was the prime consideration in determining their wages. Around the 
1970s the role of white collar workers changed, and the preceding small amount of 
white collar workers grew.286 White collar workers changed from being ‛the officials 
of the employerʼ, to employees with qualified responsibilities. With the advent of 
technical developments discussed above287 and new forms of work the profile of blue 
collar workers changed. Blue collar workers began more increasingly performing 
work with qualified responsibilities. This development resulted in the continued dif-
ferentiation between the types of workers becoming growingly outdated.288 
In order to remedy the outdated pay system ERA new General Agreements on 
Pay Grades for the German metal industry were agreed on. ERA was the result of 
many years of negotiation. In 2003 the first bargaining district agreed on new non-
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discriminatory, contemporary characteristics for wage formation in a general agree-
ment on pay grades.289 The other regions successively adopted the pilot agreement, 
with regional specifications and adaptations.290 This was the ‘biggest post-war col-
lective agreement reform’291 and was faced with strong resistance. The ERA agree-
ment ensured greater fairness for all employees through norms and benchmarks for 
proportionate income differentials between occupational levels. 
The first attempts to implement a unified wage system dates back to the 
1970s. In 1979 the first collective negotiations in the metal industry took place in the 
bargaining area Nordrhein-Westfalen.292 The key demands and negotiations that ul-
timately led to the revised pay structure in the form of ERA will be briefly discussed 
beneath.  
4.1.1 The key-demands 
There were a number of key demands that led to the formation of ERA. These key 
demands were that wage-earners and salary-earners should enjoy the same income 
opportunities for comparable work and working conditions. 293 It was a demand that 
continuous education and dynamic pay structures should be implemented, collec-
tively agreed minimum working conditions should be introduced and a new under-
standing of performance should be established, which is as the former head of the IG 
Metall Franz Steinkühler 1981 stated ‛holistically oriented on humans and not de-
tached from men guided by the dictates of the stopwatch.ʼ294 
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Given growing unemployment, the controversies over reduced working time 
became more intense. To negotiate both topics simultaneously seemed to be impos-
sible. Reduction in working hours, developed as a predominant topic.295 Under these 
framework conditions, negotiations on a new wage structure had to be put aside. The 
first negotiations on a new framework pay agreement were abandoned.296 However, 
the remaining scope for negotiations have been used to introduce the first elements of 
a new job evaluation structure in the metal and electrical industry, for example, in the 
bargaining area Baden-Wuerttemberg.297 
With the conclusion of a collective agreement to progressively implement the 
35-hour work week the block on negotiations was dissolved.298 Around 1990 IG 
Metall and Gesamtmetall agreed on the need for a renewed pay structure. The first 
resumption of the talks took place in 1989 in Baden-Wuerttemberg. But it took an-
other 14 years to come to an agreement.299 Due to crises in the industry and tough 
negotiations the negotiations were broken off in 1996. However, after the IG Metall 
threatened to take industrial action in order to come to an agreement, the employer 
organisations returned to the negotiation table.300 The motivation for the resumption 
of the talks, it seems, was caused by the threat of taking industrial action. 
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4.1.2 The perception of management and works councils 
A growing number of works councils and managers agreed on the view that the pre-
vious system of salary formation was not well-tailored for the present future.301 The 
parties of the collective pay agreement seemed to lose their structure-creating func-
tion for the metal and electrical industry. On company level some works councils de-
veloped complementary solutions dependent on the local strength to negotiate.302 The 
previous system did not seem to have yet begun to fray, but it became evident what 
would happen if the negotiations failed. It seemed to become realistic that in the long 
term a growing number of local agreements could delegitimize the collective pay 
structure set by the collective bargaining parties.303  
Future viability of the operational remuneration systems according to the judgement of man-
ager and works councils of the metal industry in 1998 (figures in per cent)304 
Are the procedures used in your operation for wage formation fit for the future? 
 for classification pur-
poses (basic pay) 
performance-based pay bonuses 
 Manager works 
council 
manager works 
council 
manager works 
council 
perfectly 
suitable 
29 33 30 22 29 13 
partially 
suitable 
43 33 43 38 32 42 
outdated 19 31 23 28 26 28 
still un-
clear 
0 6 5 13 14 17 
Figure 13: The future viability of the operational remuneration systems before ERA 
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Company actors recognised the reform of the collective pay agreement system as in-
creasingly desirable. This is shown in the figures of the 1998 survey - from the 
F.A.K.T. institute305 of the University of Tubingen showing the perception of the role 
players within companies. 
There were intellectual speculations in large corporations about what would 
happen if the negotiations failed, but there was no serious alternative if a breakdown 
in the negotiations occurred.306 To continue with the previous model would have led 
to a progressive loss of legitimacy of the structuring role of the collective agreement. 
What is the value of a collective pay agreement which does not reflect the present 
company reality? It would, however, be an exaggeration to state that the previous 
collective agreements no longer applied, but it was apparent that they would lose 
their relevance without a progressive reform. 
Nevertheless, opinions and assessments from the company protagonists var-
ied widely. Having different requirements of members is a challenge in successful 
negotiations in a trade union as a membership organisation. The crucial impulse for 
the change was set by the administrative structure. The IG Metall and the metal em-
ployers’ organisations agreed that there was no alternative but to create a new con-
cept for a collective pay agreement.307 
A most important requirement was that wage- and salary-earners with compa-
rable working conditions enjoy the same income opportunities.308 It is with this 
background that ERA was implemented; the content of ERA will be discussed in 
greater detail below. 
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The acronym ERA stands for ‘Entgeltrahmenabkommen’ which means the 
collectively agreed ‘general agreement on pay grades.’309 In the German metal indus-
try, ERA replaced the former system of General Agreements on Pay Grades by in-
troducing a new unified payment system for blue and white collar workers from 23 
June 2003 in the first bargaining region in the German metal and electrical indus-
try.310 
The ERA Agreement has been negotiated in line with the German legal 
framework for collective bargaining in the private sector.311 The German model for 
collective bargaining on which the ERA Agreement is based guarantees independent 
negotiations for trade unions, employers and their organisations.312 
The ERA Agreements in the German metal and electrical industry introduced 
a new model of basic income for the eleven different German bargaining regions in 
the metal and electrical industry between 2003 and 2005.313 This model moved away 
from a long-lasting tradition of entering into collective agreements to regulate wage 
structures in the metal and electrical industries.314 Traditionally, wage agreements re-
flected a differentiation mostly between three groups of workers namely, blue collar 
workers, and white collar technical staff and commercial staff.315 
4.2 The collective labour law profile in the German private sector 
Three aspects of German collective law in the private economy namely, the constitu-
tionally guaranteed bargaining autonomy,316 the possibility of using the Works 
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Council Act to give effect to collective agreements317 and the ability of trade union-
ists in advisory boards to directly communicate with capital318 make it possible to ef-
ficiently implement collective agreements. 
4.2.1 The Constitution or German Basic Law (GG) 
The legislation known in Germany as ‘Grundgesetz (GG)’ the (‘Basic Law’)319 has 
been adopted in practice as the German constitution.320 Section 9 (3) of the German 
Basic Law (GG) forms the foundation for the German collective bargaining law and 
guarantees collective bargaining autonomy;321 
‘The right to form associations to safeguard and improve working and economic 
conditions shall be guaranteed to every individual and to every occupation or profes-
sion. Agreements that restrict or seek to impair this right shall be null and void; 
measures directed to this end shall be unlawful.’322 
The German collective labour laws, firstly, regulate the legal relationship between 
the employees' coalitions, the trade unions on the one hand and the employers and its 
associations on the other.323 In addition to Article 9 (3) of the German Basic Law 
(GG) the German Collective Agreement Act (TVG) provides supplementary provi-
sions on the practical application of Article 9 (3) of the German Basic Law (GG) in 
respect of collective agreements.324 The provisions of the Collective Agreement Act 
                                                 
 
317
 Section 80 (1) no 1 and s 99 of the German Works Constitution Act (BetrVG). 
318
 Weiss & Schmidt (2008), 248-260. 
319
 Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany (Deutsches Grundgesetz), Act of 23 May 1949 
last amended 23 Dec 2014. 
320
 According to article 146 of the German Basic Law, the ‘Basic Law, which since the achievement 
of the unity and freedom of Germany applies to the entire German people, shall cease to apply on the 
day on which a constitution freely adopted by the German people takes effect.’; Weiss (1992), 102 pa-
ra 393. 
321
 German Basic Law. 
322
 Section 9 (3) Sentences one and two of the German Basic Law, translated by the German Federal 
Ministry of Justice and Consumer Protection (Bundesministerium der Justiz und für Verbrauch-
erschutz, BMJV). http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_gg/englisch_gg.html#p0050. 
323
 Weiss & Schmidt (2008), 180, para 428. 
324
 Ibid, 182, para 435. 
Proportionate Income Differentials, p 85 of 186 
 
 
(TVG) favour collective agreements and create legal certainty. Normative provisions 
of a collective agreement ‛have direct and mandatory effect on all employment rela-
tionships bound by the collective agreement.ʼ325 
4.2.2. The Works Constitution Act (BetrVG) 
Secondly, the German collective labour law arranges a system of workers representa-
tion on the operational, company and group level in the Works Constitution Act 
(BetrVG).326 On the operational level workers representatives have a general duty 
according to section 80 of the Works Constitution Act (BetrVG) ‘to see that effect is 
given to … collective agreements … for the benefit of the employees’.327 This right 
does not extend to enabling a works council to sue an employer to fulfil a duty under 
a collective agreement in respect of an individual worker.  
However, even without this right, the works council can act as an oversight 
body in that it exercises a measure of control in the workplace by ensuring that col-
lective agreements are fulfilled. This is especially so, in the metal and electrical in-
dustry, where works councils view the practical implementation and efficiency of 
collective agreements as one of their crucial duties. 
Historically, this was not the initial purpose of the Works Council Act in 
1920 but this has developed as the core function of such councils.328 Up to the cur-
rent time there is no legislative text prescribing this as the core function of a works 
council. Due to the fact that members of a works council are often affiliated with 
trade unions they regard the practical implementation of collective agreements to be 
essential. The above deduction may not be as applicable to smaller establishments as 
observations show that the works council act is less effective when applied to such 
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establishments. However, in an industry with larger establishments, such as the metal 
and electrical industry, the Works Council Act has proved more effective. 
One can imagine that it is easier to find people to run for the works council in 
larger establishments, as in smaller ones. Additionally, trade unions also play a 
greater role in larger establishments than in smaller establishments. Therefore, the act 
can introduce people into works councils who take care of, collective agreements and 
give them better effect.329 Members of such councils thus enjoy a greater measure of 
protection to act free of any hindrances. 
4.2.3 The Co-Determination Act (MitbG) 
Thirdly, German Collective Labour Law includes a system of corporate co-
determination by elected employee representatives in the supervisory board of larger 
companies for instance in the Co-Determination Act (MitbG).330.There is a lot to be 
said for co-determination however for the purpose of this thesis one particular aspect 
of co-determination is of relevance. In bigger companies, a section of the members of 
the supervisory board are elected by the employees. In companies with 2000 em-
ployees and upwards elected members of supervisory bodies need not be employees 
of the company.331 The outcome is that often employees belonging to trade unions 
also become elected members of supervisory boards. In huge groups this is standard. 
The effect of this practice is that in the advisory board professional trade unionists 
can take care of the implementation of collective agreements.  
These three aspects of German collective law may each, in their own way, 
have contributed to the ability to negotiate a revised version of the wage structure. 
The works councils can ensure at the company level, that a collective agreement is 
not only produced on paper but of practical relevance. The advisory boards ensure 
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that the relevant parties dealing with collective agreements come together. Lastly, 
Article 9 (3) of the German Basic Law (GG) guarantees that trade unions and em-
ployers or their organizations, are able to set the law on working and economic con-
ditions through, for example, entering into a collective agreement. 
4.3 Collective bargaining in ERA in the German metal and electrical industries 
In Germany, members of a trade union are automatically covered by any collective 
bargaining agreement entered into by their trade union.332 
4.3.1 Decentralized regional bargaining structure 
In the German collective bargaining system the collective bargaining parties usually 
distinguish between bargaining areas for regional sectoral agreements.333 In the Ger-
man metal and electrical industry several bargaining areas exist. One region is Ba-
den-Wuerttemberg. These collective agreements in the different regions are usually 
not the same but comparable. The employers` association for the metal industry is 
Gesamtmetall334. Gesamtmetall consists of regional organisations. In Baden-
Wuerttemberg the regional organisation is Südwestmetall335. The trade union for the 
metal industry is the IG Metall and is made up of numerous regional bodies. The 
trade union party for the bargaining area Baden-Wuerttemberg is the IG Metall Ba-
den-Wuerttemberg.336  
4.3.2 Types of German employer organisations 
German employer organisations in the metal and electrical industry can be catego-
rised into three types.  
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4.3.2.1 Employers` organisations only providing services 
The first type of organisation can be said to be merely a service provider holding no 
particular view on collective agreements.337 This type of organization reacts to the 
concerns of its members without any input of its own. It provides the services of liti-
gation on behalf of its members, lobbying for its industry and provides advice to its 
members. This first type of organisation is indifferent to collective agreements. Dur-
ing the 1990’s such employer organisations introduced a ‘without collective agree-
ment’-membership.338  
These types of employer organisations actively campaigned for ‘without col-
lective agreement’-membership.339 This was because for them the number of mem-
bers played a more pivotal role than active involvement in collective bargaining. 
These kinds of employer organisations have no ambition to configure and change 
working and economic conditions for their members.340  
During the years preceding ERA several regional employer organisations in 
the metal and electrical industry confined themselves to this first model of employer 
organisation no longer viewing collective bargaining as an essential part of their 
functions as before.341 An example of this type of organisation in the past was the 
employer organisation for the bargaining region Bavaria named ‘BayMe’.342  
In 2009, in the collective bargaining region Bavaria, 75 percent of the mem-
bers of ‘BayMe’ who employed 27.6 percent of the workers in the region chose the 
‘without collective agreement’-membership.343 This was the highest percentage of all 
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the regions. In the collective bargaining region of Saarland 28.1 percent of the mem-
bers of the member organisation of Gesamtmetall employing eight percent of the 
workers in the region chose this model.344 
This is indicative of two factors. The first being that the ‘without collective 
agreement’-membership is more attractive to smaller companies who may refer to 
the collective agreement by employment contract without being bound to it. Sec-
ondly, this also shows the significance of how an employer organisation views and 
understands its role. These types of employer organisations undermine collective 
bargaining. 
4.3.2.2 Employers` organisations providing services and collective bargaining on 
behalf of their members as a service 
The second type of employer organisation can be described as employers´ organisa-
tions providing services and collective bargaining on behalf of their members as a 
service.345 These types of organisations view collective bargaining as their sole busi-
ness but the role they play in collective bargaining takes the form of more passive in-
volvement. They partake in collective bargaining as a service to their members but 
play no active role in the restructuring of employment and working conditions. They 
bargain collectively on behalf of their members to avoid their members having to in-
dividually bear the costs of individual collective bargaining. 
These types of organisations hold no structuring vision for the improvement 
in working and economic conditions.346 The employer organisation for the bargain-
ing region Lower Saxony named ‘Niedersachsenmetall’ can be seen as this second 
type of employer organisation.347 
  
                                                 
 
344
 Behrens (2011), 149. 
345
 Bahnmüller et al (2010), 258. 
346
 Bahnmüller et al (2010), 258. 
347
 Bahnmüller & Schmidt (2009), 26. 
Proportionate Income Differentials, p 90 of 186 
 
 
4.3.2.3 The proactive regulators 
The third type can be described as proactive regulators.348 This type of employers` 
organisations actively engage in improving working and economic conditions.349 
They play a role in the framing and structuring of collective agreements to achieve 
this aim. In order to achieve this aim they are not only active in setting out the legal 
framework through collective agreements but actively partake in the development 
and implementation of these agreements.350  
These organisations offer service as well. In addition they are visionaries in 
the regulation of employment and pay structure of the industry not only on paper but 
also in practice (proactive regulators). An example is the employer organisation for 
the bargaining region Baden-Wuerttemberg named ‘Südwestmetall’.351 After the 
agreement on ERA this employers` organisation employed thirty employees to pro-
vide advice on the implementation of the agreement to its members and to enforce 
it.352 This was done despite some members expressing discontent with the changes 
that were introduced through ERA.353 
‘Niedersachsenmetall’ and ‘Südwestmetall’ both referred to themselves as 
‘men of conviction’ in respect of collective bargaining agreements.354 All employer 
organizations within the metal and electrical industry at the time had the ‘without 
collective agreement’ membership as part of their organisation profile. ‘Niedersach-
senmetall’355 and ‘Südwestmetall’ did not, however, actively campaign for members 
to join under such membership. They did not support this model of employer organi-
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zation membership unlike, for instance, ‘BayMe’ who campaigned for this model of 
membership in the Bavarian metal and electrical industry.356 However, unlike ‘Nied-
ersachsenmetall’, ‘Südwestmetall’ acted much more ambitiously in restructuring and 
developing a new wage system for the metal and electrical industry.357 During the 
bargaining process ‘Südwestmetall’ said: ‘That the employer himself calls for the 
collective agreement, and aims at enforcing its protection is a position that is rela-
tively new. This had thus far been a measure utilised by employees.’358 The fact that 
Südwestmetall were proactive regulators had a huge impact on the success of the col-
lective bargaining process. A complementary factor was the progressive views and 
attitudes of the regional IG Metall. This will be discussed in greater detail below. 
4.3.4 The role of decentralisation for the success of ERA 
At the beginning of the negotiations it was neither evident nor clear that Baden-
Wuerttemberg would be the pilot region for the negotiations on ERA. However, in 
the years preceding the agreements it became clear that Baden-Wuerttemberg was 
the pilot area.359 Thus the decentralized structure proved to be an effective measure 
in finding the pilot region for successful negotiations on ERA. It enabled the negoti-
ating parties to find out where negotiations worked best as well as why they worked 
best in this region.360 
Although differences exist between the regions, the region Baden-
Wuerttemberg provided the first model from which to work. While the agreement 
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reached within this region only applies to it, there was coordination between trade 
unionists in the different regions and between the employer organisations within the 
different areas and with their umbrella organisation ‘Gesamtmetall’. This was the 
positive role the decentralization of negotiations played in the negotiation on ERA. 
4.3.5 Scientific research 
The practical experts discussed in 2.2 also relied on scientific support. They worked 
together with scientific researchers.361 The research created a rational footing for 
these collective agreements. During the negotiations on ERA both sides could bring 
substance to their arguments through scientific evidence, for example, by presenting 
research on possible methods on the evaluation of work.362 In the end, although deci-
sions were politically driven, scientific research bridged the gap between the respec-
tive bargaining parties enabling them to reach an agreement. 
4.3.6 Well-embedded in their environment 
A key factor contributing to the success of ERA was that the active role players were 
well established and well-embedded in their environment. This enabled them to han-
dle any difficulties faced due to discontent of their members with change. As one can 
imagine, and we will see the restructured wage system was not happily accepted by 
everyone nor viewed as beneficial by all. The changes in the wage systems thus 
brought unrest into companies and disappointment to some union members. There-
fore trade unions and employer organisations needed to be well established in order 
to exude strength and needed to have the ability to cope with any unrest amongst 
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their members. Additionally these organisations needed to have the vision to see the 
long term advantages of the changes brought about by a modernised wage structure. 
The IG Metall and the employer organisations of the German metal and elec-
trical industry have a high number of members, both can be seen as being very well-
embedded in their environment and in this regard were well prepared for the renewal 
of the wage structure in the German metal and electrical industry.363 The IG Metall 
has a good percentage of members and is the biggest trade union in Germany.364 The 
employer organisations and the IG Metall in the German metal and electrical indus-
try are well organized. Both bargaining parties can speak for their respective branch 
and have a strong negotiation and bargaining power due to their high percentages of 
members.365 They are knowledgeable and are able to highlight what is beneficial to 
themselves as well as what is acceptable for the other side.366 This facilitated the suc-
cess of ERA. 
4.4. The ERA Agreement in Baden-Wuerttemberg – its norms and benchmarks for 
wage finding 
Prior to ERA, each bargaining region had numerous collective pay agreements. 
These collective pay agreements differentiated between wage-earners and salary-
earners, and further differentiated between commercial and technical salary earn-
ers.367 Each collective pay agreement regulated its own category of worker and con-
sisted of an individualised pay structure. Particular work tasks were defined in each 
agreement and a specific wage was allocated to a defined task. Over a period of sev-
eral decades each agreement developed independently as the demands of the working 
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world changed. Technological developments368 had a sizeable, autonomous influence 
on the categorization of occupational levels in the metal industry and played a varied 
influential role on each of the collective agreements relating to the different types of 
workers.  
The focus of this discussion will be on the norms and benchmarks for wage 
finding set in the pilot ERA bargaining region Baden-Wuerttemberg. Although there 
were different negotiation outcomes in each bargaining region; these differences will 
only be highlighted where it may be of interest and relevance in discussing the prac-
tical implementation of section 27 of the EEA. The number of pay categories in 
terms of the collective agreement for example may differ amongst regions.369 This is 
not crucial for understanding the wage finding structure in the ERA agreements, and 
this discussion will focus on exploring the norms and benchmarks for wage finding 
set in Baden-Wuerttemberg. There are important general aspects that need to be de-
tailed in order for a clear understanding of ERA. These aspects will be addressed 
herein under. 
4.4.1 The term ‛general agreementʼ on pay grades 
In order to understand the reformed wage structure it is vital that one understands the 
meaning of a general agreement on pay grades. An ERA agreement is a collective 
agreement on pay grades.370 Such an arrangement explains and regulates grading sys-
tems. In Germany wage and salary grading systems are usually regulated by general 
collective arrangements; they typically explain the number of wage grades for all 
workers under the higher management structure of establishments.371 The wage 
grades stipulate the characteristics of work tasks that fall within a specific wage 
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grade.372 Arrangements on pay grades are generally concluded to cover long time 
frames as the issues they regulate do not call for their regular modification.373 The 
fixing of pay levels on the other hand requires regular adjustment. Such collective 
agreements, therefore, usually cover shorter time periods of for example one year.374 
4.4.2 The principle of cost neutrality of ERA 
It is important to know that during the negotiations on ERA, it was agreed upon that 
the implementation of ERA would be cost neutral and that no person ought to run at 
a monetary loss in execution of the new wage system.375 The attainment of the cost 
neutral implementation of ERA proved technically challenging. In the old wage sys-
tem unjustifiable income differentials of around 400 Euro were reported.376 Solutions 
eradicating such wage extreme differentials had to be found. In order to remedy un-
justifiable wage differences amongst employees in a cost neutral manner it was in-
evitable that adjustments had to be made which would benefit some employees while 
others would suffer a loss. During the implementation phase they called people 
whose income was reduced ‛Überschreiterʼ377 (over-exceeders) and those who re-
ceive a raise in income ‛Unterschreiterʼ378 (under-exceeders). 
4.4.2.1 No nominal income losses for the employees 
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To enable the cost neutral implementation of ERA, measures had to be introduced to 
reduce the wages of those employees exceeding the wage limits in ERA for their oc-
cupation and to increase the wages of those who fell under the minimum wage levels 
set by ERA for their occupation. 
In order to realise no nominal income losses for employees, the collective 
agreement partners in all bargaining areas agreed on a number of transformative 
measures.379 These measures will be set out underneath. Firstly, the collective 
agreement parties decided that wage transformation from the old wage system to 
ERA would be carried out over a period of five years. They agreed that, for people 
whose incomes were below the ERA pay levels for their occupation, pay should pro-
gressively increase during this transformation phase and reach the acceptable ERA-
level over a 60 month period (five years).380 In this manner their income is not in-
stantaneously raised, but increased over time ensuring that the new wage system is 
progressively implemented. 
The principle that no one should lose nominal income also played an impor-
tant role in the reduction of the salaries of employees who were above the ERA earn-
ing threshold for their occupation. 381 In respect of these persons whose income lev-
els exceeded the ERA limits, the maximum income risk (the maximum percentage of 
income under the old wage system they could lose) was set at ten percent of their 
former pay under the old wage system. This 10 percent was progressively subtracted 
from their annual pay increase under the new wage system. In this manner they were 
not at a loss of nominal income but there was a reduction in their pay increase re-
ceived until the entire 10 percent is deducted over the five year period.382 The re-
maining percentage is viewed as an extra sum and has been transformed into an addi-
                                                 
 
379
 Manthey, Martina & Meine, Hartmut ‛Der Entgeltrahmentarifvertrag in der niedersächsischen Me-
tallindustrieʼ WSI Mitteilungen, vol 57 No 2 (2004), 108-109, 109. 
380
 Bahnmüller & Schmidt (2007), 363. 
381
 Bahnmüller & Schmidt (2009), 112. 
382
 Ibid. 
Proportionate Income Differentials, p 97 of 186 
 
 
tional dynamic income element. This extra sum increases with the development of 
the new collectively agreed wage system.383 
The progressive growth and progressive reduction of incomes under the old 
wage system were carried out in order to ensure that the new wage system could suc-
cessfully be implemented with considerations of fairness and social justice. 
4.4.2.2 Cost neutrality security 
The collective bargaining parties agreed on what can be termed ‛cost neutrality secu-
rityʼ. This refers to an agreement by the parties that the wage sum of an establish-
ment may rise during the five-year implementation of ERA by no more than 2.79.384 
In a way this agreed percentage by which the wage sum of an establishment could 
rise may be viewed as transformation costs. During the beginning of the phase of im-
plementing ERA, the agreed 2.79 percent was used in its totality for the payment of 
wages, and the unused difference had to be paid into a fund by the establishment, to 
be used at such a time when the 2.79 percent became needed for it to pay the total 
wage costs.385 The money placed into the fund acted as a safety net for employers to 
fall back on at a later stage when the 2.79 percent may not have be sufficient to cover 
its total wage costs.386  
It was agreed that during the five year implementation phase, the total wage 
costs of an establishment was to stay within the ‛extra costs corridorʼ of between 
zero and 2.79 percent. If over the five year period the 2.79 percent on average was 
not enough to cover the total wage development of an establishment, there was a 
mechanism for the adjustment of annual special payments. This mechanism was put 
in place in order to ensure that an establishment would not have to incur costs ex-
ceeding the 2.79 percent. An example of such a mechanism used where the 2.79 per-
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cent on average proved insufficient, is the reduction of the year-end bonuses of em-
ployees of the establishment. It is imperative to point out that there are no cases indi-
cating that such mechanisms for the reduction of annual special payments had to be 
used. 
This five-year transformation period, discussed above, was part of a longer 
ERA implementation process.387 The longer process included the execution of other 
ERA concepts such as the determination of pay categories; this determination pre-
ceded the five year transformation period. A discussion on the determination of pay 
categories during the negotiations on ERA will follow. 
4.4.3 The core elements of ERA in Baden-Wuerttemberg 
This discussion on the determination of pay categories during the negotiations on 
ERA will focus on such determinations in the region of Baden-Wuerttemberg. As in 
other regions, ERA in Baden-Wuerttemberg describes the elements of pay, the pay 
categories, performance related payment, allowances for stress the wage structure, 
work valuation methods, conflict resolution mechanisms, the transformation process 
and the implementation phase.388 
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4.4.3.1 Three elements of pay 
The ERA pay can be divided into three elements. 
 
Figure 14: The ERA elements of pay 
The first component is basic pay. Such payment is related to the requirements of the 
task assigned.389 The second component is performance-related pay.390 ERA offers a 
novel, different means of evaluating performance-related pay. ERA provides that on 
average the performance-related-pay payable within an establishment cannot exceed 
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15 percent of the total wage costs for all employees.391 The third component is the al-
lowance for stress and ambient influences.392 Such payment is equivalent to what is 
payable for pay category seven of ERA.393Each of the above elements of pay will be 
further detailed.  
4.4.3.2 The basic pay – 17 pay categories 
The model for basic pay under ERA consists of 17 pay categories.  
Figure 15: The 17 ERA pay categories 
These categories do not differentiate between blue collar and white collar workers, 
but are applicable to all employees ranging from unskilled to highly skilled work-
ers.394 
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The idea behind a pay category model is to develop a measure of proportion-
ality between different categories of workers. Pay increases do not affect this struc-
ture; the regular negotiations on pay increases are still applicable to this pay scale. 
Therefore one can say that the proportionality between the categories of work the 
parties have agreed on provide at least midterm stability. This is advantageous, at the 
very least for the time being, as ERA is indicative of how time consuming reaching 
an agreement on payment structures can be.395 Occupational scientific research mod-
els like the effort-reward imbalance model shows how important it is for productive-
ness that employees feel as though they are being treated fairly.396 This model shows 
that where employees perceive that they are unfairly treated, it affects their quality of 
work. Unfair treatment is a stressor which has the potential to affect employees’ 
health and ability to work.397 
The median of the pay category model above, is pay category seven.398 This 
can be seen as the benchmark category against which fair payment for all other pay 
categories is measured. Pay category seven dictates the lowest amount of pay a 
skilled worker may receive. This category was used as a measure from which to de-
termine a proportional salary for the lower categories of unskilled and semi-skilled 
workers.399 Looking at this category enabled parties, especially the trade unions, to 
take care in ensuring that the difference in the payment received for a category seven 
worker and a worker in the lower categories is proportionate.400 
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Category seven was also used to measure the proportionality of the payment 
received by highly-skilled and experienced workers up to pay category seventeen and 
above (higher management).401 The difference between payment for pay category 
seven workers and the payment for highly-skilled workers in higher pay categories 
was compared to ensure proportionality. The parties agreed that the lowest basic pay 
for unskilled workers is 75 percent of pay category seven and the highest basic pay 
for the highly skilled worker is 180 percent of pay category seven.402 
The use of norms and benchmarks to determine the pay of an employee is a 
general feature used in collective agreements.403 This reflects the collective bargain-
ing parties` understanding of fairness, although they are driven by different motives. 
The employer on the one hand does not want to have unmotivated staff who feel un-
der-valued, while trade unions address aspects of dignity, solidarity and appreciation 
of employees. 
An increase in pay is frequently negotiated in a separate collective wage 
agreement while, as described above, a framework wage agreement is at least stable 
from a mid-term perspective.404 
ERA provides for analytical job evaluation in the form of a point system for 
the finding of the correct pay category for basic pay which applies to all pay catego-
ries.405 Points are awarded for the following: (1) Knowledge and capabilities,406 (2) 
Thinking,407 (3) Room for manoeuvre and responsibility,408 (4) Communication409 
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Table 17: ERA pay categories` value numbers
The number of points received under the five categories discussed above resulted in 
seventeen pay categories.
sessment above you fall within pay category one, if you are awarded between 7 and 8 
points for example you fall within category two. In this manner the points you are 
awarded dictate the pay category you fall within.
The ERA-value-numeral
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ERA-Value-numeral-grading-procedure419 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 18: The ERA-Value-numeral-grading-procedure 
The collective bargaining parties also provided a system of level descriptors and 122 
pay category examples.420 These are also part of a mid-term collective agreement and 
may be used in establishments to assign employees to a pay category. In respect of 
work which is not specifically named these examples can still help to compare or dif-
ferentiate such work from named examples. The collective agreement provides estab-
lishments with two alternative methods for the valuation of work; they can simply 
follow the point system set out in the agreement or they can develop additional pay 
category examples for their establishment and compare such examples with those in 
the agreement.421 
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The different categories and levels within ERA should be used to analyse the 
work in respect of its characteristics and not based on its title.422 This element plays 
an important role in reducing unfair differentiation between white and blue collar 
workers. In many collective agreements prior to ERA, work done by blue collar 
workers was evaluated based on the job title and not the requirements of the job. This 
is indicative of the effect unfavourable views and attitudes had on blue collar work-
ers. For example tailoring work done by a blue collar worker would more likely be 
undervalued by being labelled as simple sewing work.423 The work done by white 
collar workers on the other hand was viewed taking into account the responsibilities 
and characteristics of the work.424 
The grading system agreed to in ERA, focuses on the responsibilities and the 
characteristics of the work in calculating an employee’s remuneration. This plays an 
important role in minimising unjust income differentials between blue and white col-
lar workers in the German metal and electrical industry. If one looks at the work of a 
lifeguard for example one can see how important this aspect is for the valuation of 
work. A lifeguard spends the most part of his work day sitting in the sun and watch-
ing the sea, the true characteristic of such a job is, however, to save lives when it be-
comes needed. Evaluating the work done by life guard, by looking at what is pre-
dominantly done, would lead to a skewed and unfair result. This manner in which 
ERA evaluates work is thus an important step taken in ensuring that unfair differen-
tiation in the valuation of work is eradicated. 
To further ensure that the work carried out by an employee is fairly evaluated, 
ERA introduced a mechanism for the valuation of work, and resolving conflicts on 
the valuation of work. This mechanism is explained below.  
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4.4.3.3 The conflict resolution mechanism 
A conflict resolution mechanism was built into ERA to ensure that all work was 
fairly evaluated in accordance with ERA. A commission consisting of equal numbers 
of representatives from the workforce and the employer had the job of evaluating the 
work done within an establishment.425 This commission was referred to as the 
‘Paritätische Kommission’ (PaKo).426 If the members of PaKo do not agree on the 
valuation of work the extended PaKo will try to reach an agreement on the specific 
valuation. The extended PaKo refers to external members of the trade union and the 
employer’s organisation who join the PaKo. When the extended PaKo cannot find a 
solution an arbitration board tries to resolve the conflict on the valuation of work. 
The arbitration board consists of the extended PaKo and an independent chairman, 
most often a judge from the labour court. If no agreement is reached by the arbitra-
tion board a decision is taken based on the majority vote of the members of the 
board.427 
This mechanism provides a measure by which parties to the collective agree-
ment take responsibility for the correct categorisation of the workforce.428 Where 
there is a change in the job requirements the parties to the collective agreement have 
the responsibility to exercise their control.429 Through this conflict resolution mecha-
nism they ensure that despite any changes in the job requirements, the job is still cor-
rectly categorised in accordance with the characteristics of the work done. This 
measure ensures that the collective bargaining parties take responsibility in putting 
collective agreements into practice in establishments. In addition, through this 
mechanism, they make it their responsibility to ensure that work is correctly evalu-
ated. 
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4.4.3.4 Performance-related pay 
There has been a long standing tradition of awarding different performance-related 
payment for white and blue collar workers.430 In the past between ten to thirty per-
cent of an employee’s wages was performance related, depending on the applicable 
collective agreement.431 Performance-related pay was determined through piecework 
systems, bonus models and target agreement systems, all concepts and criteria set in 
the existing collective agreements.432 
The development of a general model for performance-related pay was a huge 
topic of discussion in order to reach a unified concept on such pay.433 The parties to 
ERA agreed on three methods for determining performance-related pay namely judg-
ing the performance of the employee, comparing figures (for example comparing 
production figures of employees and rewarding those with higher production fig-
ures), and target agreements (setting targets, by agreement which an employee has to 
reach in order for the employee to receive monetary reward). 
The parties to the ERA collective agreement contracted that performance-
related pay within an establishment on average cannot exceed 15 percent of the total 
wage costs of that establishment. This does not mean that an individual receives 15 
percent; an individual may receive between zero and 30 percent of the basic pay de-
pending on performance, but within an establishment this pay element may not ex-
ceed 15 percent of its total wage costs.434 The collective agreement parties set criteria 
by which the performance of an employee can be measured. These criteria look at 
what is to be measured, while the methods look at how performance is measured. 
The different criteria can be combined but the parties have advised that no more than 
two criteria be used in conjunction. 
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These criteria are: 
Processes (when you measure work based on processes, based on sums, time 
and usage) 
Clients ( when you measure performance based on client satisfaction and cli-
ent complaints) 
Products (when performance is determined based on ability to solve problems 
and idea development) 
Employee (when the employees performance is determined based on his or 
her initiative and dedication) 
Finance (when costs and stock act as a measure of performance)435 
The parties to the collective agreement expressly agreed that performance-related 
pay cannot be connected to the success of the company or be influenced by any sick 
leave taken by an employee.436 The criteria discussed above are the standards by 
which performance-related pay may be measured. An establishment is not restricted 
to this standard and can develop additional criteria.437 Any such additional criteria 
must be related specifically to the work to be done and must be transparent. In addi-
tion the employee has to be able to influence the criteria and the criteria must be re-
lated to the job.438 
In conclusion, one can say that performance-related pay is possibly one of the 
most flexible parts of the ERA agreement. The structured nature of the criteria makes 
them a more objective tool in reducing discriminatory practices. A singular system 
for both blue and white collar workers now exists under ERA.439 
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4.4.3.5 Allowance for stress and ambient influences 
Payment for stress and ambient influences was much higher in the past and only ap-
plicable to blue collar workers.440 The maximum pay allowance for stress and ambi-
ent influences was also related to the pay categories of blue collar workers. Therefore 
there were different allowances amongst the pay categories for the same kinds of 
stressors.441 In the ERA collective agreement, average stress factors are already re-
flected in the basic pay structure.442 Therefore, they reduced this pay element to ten 
percent of the total pay of pay category seven.443 
This ten percent of pay category seven is applicable to all employees regard-
less of their pay category. ERA has equalised the position and eradicated any form of 
differentiation in payment received for stress and ambient influences. In the past 
people could ‘earn’ more than double their salary for working in unhealthy or under 
stressful conditions.444 The parties to the ERA collective agreement have developed 
four work load levels, these work load levels are differentiated by four kinds of bur-
dens, namely: burden on muscles, burden caused by under-stimulation, burden 
caused by noise and burden caused by other external factors have been included as a 
general load level.445 
In each work load level one can receive two points.446 As mentioned above no 
points can be received for average stressors because such stressors are reflected in 
the pay group. In the case of a burden greater than an average stressor one can re-
ceive one point while two points reflect a high burden.447 Therefore, in total, it is 
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possible to receive eight points, but the maximum allowance is already reached with 
four points.448 If one receives between four and eight points you receive the full per-
centage of the allowance for stress and ambient influences, namely ten percent of pay 
category seven.449 
The pay for stress or work load is unconnected to a pay category. This may in 
fact reduce the pay gap between pay category seven and the lower pay categories 
since unskilled and semi-skilled employees falling into the lower pay categories 
more often work in harsher working environments. 
4.4.3.6 Role and number of pay category examples 
In the past, while pay category examples existed, they had no binding function.450 
Within establishments trade union members of works councils successfully and 
influentially played a role in pushing employees into the highest pay categories pos-
sible. It was important for the IG Metall that there be decision room within estab-
lishments to provide the IG Metall’s operational functionaries with scope in respect 
of pay category determination. Their functionaries successfully used this scope for 
the benefit of employees. In the past employers organisations also found it important 
to provide their members with wide-ranging scope in the decision making process.451 
Therefore at the beginning of the negotiations, the parties placed focus on the role 
and number of pay category examples. 
Remarkably, it was Südwestmetall that made a fundamental turn-around. 
They focused on the structural role of collective agreements and pleaded for a 
stronger position for the framework wage agreement and its pay category exam-
ples.452 This placed the IG Metall in an unusual position since it is usually the trade 
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union that emphases the importance of the structural role of collective agreements.453 
According to the participants of the negotiation process, Südwestmetall’s line of ar-
guments was a large contributory factor in resolving the debates turning on whether 
pay category examples should be binding or not.454 Südwestmetall argued that the 
collective agreement parties do not only have the authority to set legal norms and 
benchmarks, but have the power to implement any such norms and benchmarks.455  
Decisions of the German Federal Labour Court reflect what the collective 
agreement parties settled on. The trade union cannot leave it to the establishments to 
decide whether or not to follow the policies set by the collective agreement. If this 
occurs, the structural function it has in the industry will be lost. This line of argument 
was convincing. The two sides to the collective agreement both agreed on having 
122 binding pay category examples.456 
The agreement focuses mainly on the structuring role of a general agreement 
on pay grades for the metal and electrical industry by Südwestmetall and IG Metall 
Baden-Wuerttemberg; in essence this is the most distinctive feature of the bargaining 
processes for ERA in Baden-Wuerttemberg.457 This made the processes in the pilot 
region unlike other bargaining areas of this industry and may, retrospectively explain 
why, in this region, the agreement was not only possible, but also, was so well 
thought out. 
4.4.3.7 Conflict on the performance related pay 
As previously mentioned, the ERA collective agreement parties agreed that fifteen 
percent of the total wage costs of an establishment would be performance-related 
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pay.458 However, instances may arise where the performance on average within an 
establishment is above 15 percent and the budget for performance related pay proves 
insufficient. It was thus important to determine whether the agreed fifteen percent set 
the minimum for performance-related pay or whether it set the ceiling for such pay 
and was binding.459 The IG Metall was in favour of the fifteen percent setting the 
minimum of what should be paid out to employees for performance.460 Südwestmet-
all agreed that no one should receive less than the fifteen percent even if employees 
perform better than expected.461 Südwestmetall, however, did not want to raise the 
agreed budget for performance-related pay.462 To address this difference in opinion 
the parties agreed to a small percentage by which the budget may be exceeded or by 
which parties can fall short of the budget. However, if the performance-related pay is 
lower than fourteen percent or higher than sixteen percent the parties of the collective 
agreement have to be consulted.463 
4.4.3.8 Conflict on cost neutrality 
Cost neutrality, was of utmost importance for the employer since the initial outset of 
negotiations.464 The parties could not agree on cost neutrality until the 1990’s.465 In 
1995 IG Metall had no choice but to agree to cost neutrality in the implemention of 
ERA as Südwestmetall threatened to withdraw from negotiations.466 
Both parties to the collective agreement knew that the implementation of 
ERA would not factually be cost free, especially since they agreed to upgrade the 
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payment of highly skilled workers.467 The solution was to implement the new wage 
model progressively over a time frame.468 The parties calculated the costs for the im-
plementation of ERA on 2.79 period of the total wage costs of an establishment.469  
The parties agreed that the usual annual pay raises should not be paid out in 
full for a period of five years. Instead a percentage of the usual annual pay raise 
should be paid into a fund; this fund should be used for the wage costs of an estab-
lishment if the formal wage costs were insufficient. 
It was agreed that the normal annual raise of an establishment should be paid 
by the establishment while ERA costs should be paid by the fund. If the fund was not 
used for its intended purpose a mechanism was put in place for the fund to be paid 
out to the employees.470 
In North Rhine-Westphalia, for example, the bargaining parties agreed on the 
implementation of ERA on the 18th December 2013, not long after it was agreed on 
in Baden-Wuerttemberg.471 They started with the ERA-fund in June 2002.472  
In May 2002 they had, however, already agreed on the division of the annual 
pay raise into two components. One component was paid out as an actual pay in-
crease; the other component of the increase was paid into the ERA-fund. By 1 March 
2005, the ERA-fund had sufficient resources.473 
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Date of pay rise Annual pay rise Percentage received 
by employee 
ERA fund instal-
ment 
1 Jun 2002 4.0 % 3.1 % 0.9 % 
1 Jun 2003 3.1 % 2.6 % 0.5 % 
1 Mar 2004 2.2 % 1.5 % 0.7 % 
1 Mar 2005 2.7 % 2.0 % 0.7 % 
ERA instalments   2.8 % 
Expected costs of implementation  2.79 % 
Figure 19: ERA-fund in the ERA bargaining region North Rhine-Westphalia474 
There are three instances described in the collective agreement in the bargaining area 
North Rhine-Westphalia that can arise in respect of the fund.475 Firstly, it may be that 
the annual raise is under 2.79 and insufficient. Secondly, it may be that the raise is an 
amount between 0 and 2.79 percent and a portion of the fund thus goes unused. 
Lastly, it may be the case that the annual pay raise paid into the fund is more than 
2.79 percent.476 Agreed solutions were developed for all the scenarios.  
If the first instance arose and the money paid into the fund was insufficient 
and fell below 2.79 percent, then the employer was allowed, in terms of the collec-
tive agreement, to reduce other expressly-named pay elements to meet this insuffi-
ciency, for example the annual bonus could be reduced.477 In the second instance 
where the fund was not completely needed, the unused part should be paid out to the 
employees as a one-off payment.478 The part between zero and 2.79 that is unused is 
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paid out in full to the employees.479 If the last instance were to arise and it was clear 
from the beginning that the fund wouldn't be needed it was agreed that it should be 
paid out to the employees in two parts during the implementation phase. If more 
money was saved than what was necessary for the fund the overflow would result in 
a raise of the annual payment.480 
In conclusion, through this mechanism the parties of ERA were able to solve 
the conflict on cost neutrality and could continue the negotiations after 1995.481 Cost 
neutrality was possibly the most difficult conflict that arose in the ERA negotiations 
but led to a visibly creative solution. 
4.4.4 The implementation of ERA 
The negotiation phase of ERA was dominated by the trade unions and employer or-
ganisations. Unlike the implementation phase it was not a process carried out at 
company level. The concept of ERA was driven by the trade unions and employer 
organisations and the implementation had to be carried out by workplace actors sup-
ported by these organisations. 
4.4.4.1 The role of the organisations 
Traditionally, trade unions were more active in implementing collective agree-
ments.482 The majority of employer organisations viewed themselves more as advi-
sors and became active at the demand of their members.483 Südwestmetall acted dif-
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ferently in the negotiation and implementation phase, as described above, they took 
on a more active role from the outset.484 
The implementation of ERA was high on the agenda as the most important 
point of discussion for both IG Metall and Südwestmetall at the time.485 The IG Met-
all employed three additional lecturers for their training centre and invested a great 
deal of their time and resources in educating their staff and trade union-orientated 
members of works councils on the ERA agreement.486 Südwestmetall employed for 
the region of Baden-Wuerttemberg only, thirty ERA advisors on a limited time con-
tract.487 In using this advisory pool the organisation could organise or create a visible 
active presence within establishments which did not previously exist.488 As previ-
ously described, in the past, companies were restricted in developing the existing 
wage structure, very little room for development existed. Under ERA, however, they 
were urged by Südwestmetall to develop the wage structure set out by the ERA 
agreements.489 
The IG Metall was never a demand-oriented service provider like most em-
ployer organisations, for them ERA was a top-level issue from the outset.490 The bar-
gaining parties both wanted to guide the implementation by themselves. Südwest-
metall and IG Metall both accepted only exceptional external advisors. They de-
manded a strong role throughout for the bargaining parties.491 
A representative of Südwestmetall explained the necessity for this procedure: 
If the bargaining parties do not become active, most of the companies would choose 
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the easiest way out and would look at the new pay scale based on wages. The imple-
mentation process would be bypassed and the focus would be on ensuring as little 
change as possible. Human Resources would not have to be the bearer of bad news to 
employees whose wages would be diminished in the long term. Conflicts would be 
avoided and the ‘reset of the pay structure’ would not be achieved. Although this 
‘very tempting’ opportunity may have been attractive to companies its effect would 
undermine the aims of ERA and thus needed to be avoided. Companies would never 
discover the advantages of ERA if this approach were to be followed.492 IG Metall 
and Südwestmetall both saw the absolute necessity of playing a proactive role during 
the implementation phase and possibly placed the implementation phase on an even 
higher footing than the negotiation phase.493 They were certain that only this means 
would ensure that the years of work put into the negotiations of ERA and the insights 
gained would be worthwhile.494 They understood that, in order to achieve a change in 
a long-standing familiar pay structure, the management and monitoring of change 
was essential. 
4.4.4.2 The structure and process of the transformation 
IG Metall and Südwestmetall prepared themselves early for the implementation of 
ERA. They both had an implementation concept of their own,495 which will be set 
out below. 
IG Metall appointed their ERA-consultants; the ideal was to have consultants 
within establishments, in every local office of the IG Metall and co coordinating 
ERA consultants on the regional level. The second element of IG Metall`s implemen-
tation concept was to have project groups of different types of enterprises made up of 
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trade union representatives of the relevant enterprises. The third element was educa-
tion and qualification. The fourth element was instruction manuals.496 
There were some difficulties with the IG Metall’s implementation concept. 
On the regional level difficulties arose because only a few persons were responsible 
for the coordination of ERA’s implementation but these persons had numerous other 
duties to attend to.497 Another difficulty was that some of the project groups didn’t 
work as effectively as others which was problematic because the project groups were 
aimed at addressing general questions on ERA for its specific industry.498 A further 
problem that arose was that seminars held as part of an education and qualification 
system were focused on understanding ERA and in the beginning neglected the de-
velopment of skills for the implementation of ERA.499 The fact that instruction mate-
rials on the implementation of ERA were only ready a half a year after the start of its 
implementation was also problematic.500 Possibly the biggest difficulty in practice 
was that within establishments there were some areas where there were no active 
ERA consultants from the trade union side. Aside from these issues it should be 
noted that from the outset the IG Metall was very well prepared for the implementa-
tion of ERA.501 
Südwestmetall followed a very proactive concept for the implementation of 
ERA. They employed, as described earlier in this thesis, a pool of 30 ERA consult-
ants. They played an active role in the implementation of ERA which was not a 
known role for employer organizations.502 Their active involvement was challenging 
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for both the IG Metall and the works councils.503 The ERA consultants and employer 
organisation representatives talked to the management of most establishments and 
explained the advantages of ERA. They very actively imposed their opinion that only 
little space for interpretation of the pay categories existed for establishments.504 Ac-
cording to them there were only a few cases in which establishments could determine 
additional pay category examples. In their view 75 percent of the jobs within an es-
tablishment had been described by the 122 pay category examples. 20 percent of the 
jobs were similar to these 122 pay category examples and only 5 percent of the work 
in an establishment may have required pay category determination. They were very 
active in setting this 75/20/5 rule in relation to pay categories within companies.505 
Südwestmetall had its own education system and instruction models on the 
implementation of ERA.506 Südwestmetall urged employers not to make any deci-
sions without consulting with them.507 ERA consultants of the employer organization 
also became active in establishments together with the management. A retrospective 
view reveals that Südwestmetall was, for an employer organization, unusually fo-
cused on the practical aspects of the implementation of ERA. As a result of their ac-
tive role in the implementation phase, it seems that in the beginning of the implemen-
tation phase Südwestmetall brought the employers into a better strategic position.508 
It is reported that Südwestmetall was never before or after the implementation of 
ERA so visibly active within establishments as it was during the implementation 
phase.509 
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4.4.5 The implementation in the establishments 
4.4.5.1 The time frame 
It was agreed that ERA should be implemented between the 1 March 2005 and the 29 
February 2008 in Baden-Wuerttemberg.510 The collective bargaining parties thus 
agreed on a three year period for the implementation of ERA.511 In some establish-
ments the time frame for the implementation of ERA may have differed as there 
were numerous factors affecting it. 
The possibility of saving costs and loosing costs affected the time frame for 
the implementation within establishments.512 However, the relationship, between the 
different relevant actors within an establishment, affected the time it took for the im-
plementation within said establishment more. This can be assumed because more 
then two thirds of establishments entered into an agreement with the works council 
or the IG Metall on the implementation date for ERA and the process by which to 
implement ERA.513 In these agreements the parties agreed on when within the time-
frame they wanted to implement ERA and how they wanted to implement it. This 
shows that the parties were, in most cases, well aware that the implementation of 
ERA was a process that was dependent on the establishment’s circumstances and 
challenges.514  
The majority of establishments agreed on a procedure for the implementation 
of ERA. The date chosen by an establishment to implement ERA was most likely in 
most instances more strongly influenced by occupational circumstances and the work 
plan of the participants and not by the chance to save costs.515 However, as we will 
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see, there were cases where the potential for saving costs influenced the time frame 
for the implementation of ERA. This is so because the staff structures in the different 
kinds of establishments in the metal and electrical industry differ. 
Südwestmetall wanted to guide the establishments in the implementation of 
ERA. The companies, however, acted more self-confidently and wanted to follow 
their own measures for the implementation of ERA. Südwestmetall was centred on 
their own political and economic circumstances within the establishments and this 
drove how and when they wanted establishments to enter into the ERA implementa-
tion process. 
There were three groups of implementers. The relatively small group of ‘first mov-
ers’ may have had the hope of reducing costs with ERA. The second group wasn`t 
focussed on cost effects of ERA and looked more at the political process. The ‘late 
movers’ implemented ERA between 2007 and the beginning of 2008 and asked for a 
possible exception for their late implementation.516 
4.4.5.2 The steps of implementation 
When we look at the steps of implementation we can see a pre-phase and the steps of 
implementation from an employee’s perspective (The preliminary step, the main step 
and the appeal step). In establishments with up to five hundred employees (300 if it’s 
an establishment of a group) the employer had the choice to prepare the categoriza-
tion in conjunction with the PaKo517 or alone. In these smaller kinds of establish-
ments the pre-involvement of the PaKo was not prerequisite.518 In establishments 
where the employer decided alone on the first pay grading of employees conflicts be-
came visible in the proceeding phases. In larger establishments, where the grading 
was handled by the PaKo, conflicts also occurred. However, in these cases the con-
flicts became visible at an earlier stage. It was reported that in around a third of the 
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establishments where the employer acted alone in grading employees huge problems 
resulted.519 
The second step, the main step, can be described as the step in which the most 
conflicts in respect of the grading of employees arose. During this step it was re-
vealed that many people lost their status within the structure of their establishment 
and felt downgraded.520 Thirty-two percent of the works councils reported that the 
reaction to ERA was negative. Forty one percent reported that the reaction to ERA 
was likely to be negative. Eleven percent reported that the reaction to ERA was posi-
tive and seventeen percent reported that the reaction to ERA was likely positive.521 
Smaller conflicts have been reported in companies where management and 
the works councils had a good relationship and there was a greater sensitivity to the 
effects of the changes on employees522 In instances where there was a high number 
of employees within an establishment whose incomes exceed the ERA levels a good 
relationship between the works council and the management of the establishment 
was no aid against tough conflicts.523 However the employees opinion on the out-
come of ERA was about twice as often more negative in establishments with poor 
cooperation between works councils and management than in establishments with a 
cooperative collaboration between these parties.524 
It has been held that the reasons for downgrading employees are confusing 
when one considered that employees do not actually receive a reduced income. The 
employees receive the same income under ERA because structures have been put in 
place through ERA to ensure this. The downgrading of employees is thus confusing 
in light of this since it resulted in them feeling devalued and dissatisfied while having 
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no impact on their income. The downgrading of pay levels is understandable from 
the establishments’ perspective, but it reminds one a little of the pay level corrections 
made by companies in the past to rectify situations deemed unfair by their staff. 
The third phase, is the phase in which discrepancies in the pay levels could be 
raised by the works council and the worker. In only ten percent of the companies, 
there were no complaints reported.525 However, tough conflicts surrounding grading 
during the implementation of ERA were reported in the other 90 percent of estab-
lishments. Around 22 to 24 percent of the grading was appealed during the imple-
mentation phase.526 The percentage of appeals can be explained by the open ques-
tions on grading and by the changes in the new wage system with a shifted focus. 
Südwestmetall wanted to avoid deviations developing at a company level and 
some companies hoped to actively save money, while others were just afraid that 
their wage budget would rise. This is also another possible explanation for the con-
flicts that arose during the implementation phase. The relevant actors both wanted to 
implement a new wage system in a proper manner but the sides held different views 
on the evaluation process and its outcomes resulting in a conflict over the details 
amongst the relevant actors.527 A suggested measure of how ERA can work without 
conflicts is through the cooperative collaboration and active discussion between all 
the actors involved. In establishments with poor cooperation the conflicts in the im-
plementation of ERA spiralled more quickly.528 
The implementation of ERA worked best in companies which intensively in-
volved the works council in the grading phase. In these companies fewer conflicts 
arose in the second and third phases, and where conflicts arose the conflicts were not 
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that hard to handle.529 However, it is important to note that, as previously mentioned, 
this was only the case in the smaller number of companies.530 
In view of the discussion above it can be said there was a temporal differen-
tiation between the preliminary step, the main step and the appeal step. The different 
types of implementation can also further be differentiated from each other. The types 
of implementation will be discussed below.531 
4.4.5.3 A typology of the different implementation models at the establishment level 
The three phases described can also be further divided based on the types of estab-
lishment and the way they implemented the ERA. 
(a) The one-sided implementation 
The first type of implementation can be described as ‘one-sided implementation’532 
this was favoured by Südwestmetall. This type of implementation, however, often re-
sulted in conflicts in the second and third phase of implementation because of the 
lack of dialogue between the employer and other relevant entities such as the works 
councils.533 In some companies fights on each pay grading were reported.534 In other 
companies where the employer chose to no longer act unilaterally, the process would 
be stopped and the grading process would be recommenced in dialogue and in con-
junction with the relevant entities such as the works councils.535 Instances where this 
occurred may be described as ‘failed unilateral adoption’.536 
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(b) The integrated norms oriented implementation of the ERA 
The second type of implementation may be described as ‘integrated norms orientated 
implementation’.537 This differs largely from the first type in that all the shareholders 
were involved in the process. There were not many types of implementation which 
worked so effectively. However, this type led to widespread acceptance of the new 
wage structure in companies as it was done in conjunction with and through intensive 
dialogue with the trade union oriented works councils.538 
(c) The integrated modifying adoption of the ERA 
The third type of implementation was the ‘integrated modifying adoption of the 
ERA’539. These types of establishments tried to behave proactively in respect of the 
employees who would lose nominal income and agreed with the works council on 
the progressive reduction measures to avoid such losses.540 They agreed with works 
councils that no one should lose nominal income with the implementation of ERA. 
Within some establishments this 10 percent was reduced to 7 percent and in other 
companies to 4 percent.541 Within other establishments the 10 percent agreed on was 
not changed, but employees whose income would be reduced by 10 percent with 
ERA were paid a once-off extra payment out of the unused money in the ERA-
fund.542 In companies that made this decision there were still many conflicts raised 
because of the disappointment of employees caused by their degrading and the re-
sulting feeling of devaluation.543 
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It can be assumed that within this group there were the companies where the 
works council and the management were well aware that ERA would result in nu-
merous changes within establishments which may cause disappointment for the em-
ployees. In the process they thus tried to reduce the disappointment of employees, 
this may have helped but was not sufficient to avoid all conflicts.544 
(d) The distributive-pay, regulation-modifying adoption of ERA 
The fourth type can be called the ‘distributive-pay, regulation-modifying adoption’545 
type. A central part of the discussion for companies following this type of implemen-
tation was the concern of saving money and reduction of the total wage volume. In 
these types of establishments ERA has been viewed as critical since its inception and 
the concern to reduce pay costs dominated the implementation process for such es-
tablishments.546 It has been found that when the whole process became flooded with 
conflicts a change to a cooperative process was not effective.547 
It can be said, that for the entire implementation the social interaction be-
tween the actors, respect and understanding especially for labour could have the ef-
fect of either reducing conflicts or the lack thereof of a conflict raising affect.548 The 
implementation worked best where processes were transparent, the collaboration was 
cooperative and the company was not trying to use ERA as an instrument for the re-
duction of its wage bill. 
The significant amount of companies who saved money with ERA can possi-
bly be explained in part by the pay structure set out in ERA, but can also explain why 
so many conflicts arose. The research especially on the second form of implementa-
tion has shown that conflicts arose half as often in the view of employees when co-
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1.796 €
2.319 €
2.061 €
blue colour technical white colour commercal white colour
Before ERA: Basic pay (min 3 years vocational training)
operation and collaboration existed in the implementation of ERA.549 This does not 
in fact mean that there were less difficulties. It only shows that where conflicts have 
been dealt with through mutual respect and on equal footing (in the practical opera-
tions) between the works council and IG Metall on the one side and management and 
Südwestmetall on the other, the conflict management was deemed to have been han-
dled better and was more positively perceived by employees.550 This explains the dif-
ferent responses by employees to the question of how great the conflicts around the 
ERA implementation were. As one knows there are always different ways of dealing 
with disagreements. It is significant that in companies where there was cooperation 
and collaboration by respecting the different roles and opinions of the actors the 
same proceedings have been perceived as half as conflicted as under opposite cir-
cumstances.551 
4.4.6 The outcome of ERA - a stabilization of collective agreements? 
ERA eradicated the differences between white collar and blue collar workers in the 
German metal and electrical industry.  
Table 20: Before ERA: Basic pay (min 3 years vocational training)552 
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Table 21: Before ERA: Workload allowance for equal workload553 
This was a huge step taken in eliminating wage inequalities especially when one 
looks, for example, at the differences of the wages for skilled workers and unskilled 
workers after a three-year period of vocational training. 
Table 22: Before ERA: Performance-related pay554 
However, it can also be said that the alternative would have meant a progressive loss 
of the important structuring role of collective agreements in the metal and electrical 
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branch. The number of trade union members did not decline through the implementa-
tion of ERA, nor did the number of members of employer organisations decline.555 
It is without doubt that in such a long term process there are things which 
could have been done better or could have gone worse. However, if one asks the 
question of whether high wage levels in the industry (not only in some companies of 
the industry) could have continued, the answer would probably be, not without ERA. 
It is evident from the discussions above that numerous difficulties arose dur-
ing the implementation of ERA, in dealing with these conflicts the actors may have 
been under too much pressure to pay sufficient attention to gender pay inequalities. 
This, however, does not mean that ERA does not offer tools to address the gender 
pay gap. This issue will be discussed in more detail below. 
4.5 The implementation of ERA from the gender pay gap perspective 
The historical marginalisation of females in German society resulted in the gender 
pay gap in Germany. 
In a similar way the apartheid wage gap was caused by the marginalisation of 
the black majority and the preferential treatment of the white minority. The discrimi-
nation on these grounds is based on visible characteristics of an individual. In the 
same manner that one cannot hide one`s gender one`s colour is also clearly visible. 
As a result the lessons learnt from the implementation of ERA on the reduc-
tion of the gender pay gap can be of equal applicability for the reduction of the 
apartheid wage gap through section 27 of the EEA. The experiences on the gender 
pay gap during the drafting and implementation of ERA will be discussed more ex-
tensively below. 
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Figure 23: Gender Pay Gap in the European Union, figures 2012
An extensive gender pay gap is still evident in Germany today
tween 22 and 23 percent while the European average is around 1
4.5.1 What the figures 
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construction sector) and 31 percent (for sectors dealing with the production of office 
machines, data processing machines, electrical engineering, precision mechanics and 
optics).558 These figures are from 2008 and deal with industries that are partly cov-
ered by ERA but can also partly be regulated by collective agreements for other in-
dustries. As a result this public data cannot present an exact picture on the effects of 
the implementation of ERA on the reduction of the gender pay gap.559 These figures 
are from the time of the implementation of ERA and also reflect the period right after 
the implementation of ERA. This was reason enough to look at the possible effects of 
ERA on the existing gender pay gap. 
4.5.2 Observations on the implementation phase 
Scientific research indicates that although the formal drafting and wording of ERA 
was a fundamental step in eradicating workplace gender discrimination, traditional 
views and attitudes to gender roles within the workplace still had influence during 
the implementation phase.560 The traditional views and attitudes that were influential 
in the implementation phase will be discussed below. 
How, in practice do traditional views and attitudes affect job valuation? As 
described earlier in this thesis, in order for a job to fetch the right number of points 
for the worker to receive the correct basic pay of said job, a job description is neces-
sary. It is reported that, especially in enterprises with no strong works council, the 
job description is determined by the supervisors of the establishment.561 
The focus of the establishments and works councils was more to ensure that 
blue collar and white collar workers were no longer unjustly differentiated between. 
The aim was to eliminate the undervaluation of blue collar workers and the over-
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valuation of white collar workers.562 This is how traditional views and attitudes 
ended up affecting the valuation of work. Placing the focus mainly on the under-
valuation of ‘blue collar workers’ and overvaluation of ‘white collar’ resulted in the 
parties losing sight of the eradication of gender wage inequalities. 
In practice supervisors often provided a more general description of the work 
done by females leading to the undervaluation of such work. The work of secretaries, 
for example, has often been described more generally. In cases where the specifics of 
the work of a secretary were not reflected in great detail, such work indirectly be-
came undervalued because the true extent of the work done by a secretary was not 
actually reflected in the point system and the job description.563 Such work should be 
valued by comparing the work done by a secretary to work done by other employees 
within the establishment. Instead the views and attitudes of the supervisor affects the 
way a job is viewed and described which, in turn, affects the valuation of the job. 
In some areas one will find more females working than males, for example, 
office bound work such as the work of a secretary is more often carried out by fe-
males than males. In practice it appears that although ERA was drafted with the 
eradication of gender wage gaps in mind, female jobs were not as highly valued as 
male jobs within establishments. 
In environments where the well-established works councils placed a greater 
focus on and acted strictly in correcting gender pay inequalities together with the IG 
Metall these works councils were able to correct and avoid the undervaluation of 
typical ‘female work’.564 Here one can see, that the job description phase does not 
have to automatically result in the persistence of the unjust gender wage gap, but it 
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can be influential where outdated views and attitudes result in inaccurate job descrip-
tions leading to the undervaluation of work.565 
Where a works council or human resources department of an establishment is 
male dominated, it is more likely that the actors are not aware of the risks of gender 
discrimination. Thus, although objective criteria for the valuation of work are set out 
in ERA; the risk of gender discrimination will not be clearly visible during the trans-
formation stage. This is problematic in that works councils and human resources de-
partments mistakenly believe that they are acting objectively in drafting job descrip-
tions since the criteria of ERA are meant to be objective. 
4.5.3 Observations during the appeal phase 
The employees and the works councils have the right to appeal against a job evalua-
tion.566 The evaluation of a job relates to what is required by the specific kind of 
work carried out by the individual, in this manner the appeal phase becomes an indi-
vidualised process. It has been observed that during the appeal phase a remarkably 
lower percentage of complaints against the job valuation occurred in areas with a 
high percentage of women.567 
This is the case even though figures reveal that the wage gap in Germany still 
persists and there are generally a greater percentage of female workers whose work is 
being undervalued. Despite this being evident more male workers have appealed 
their job valuation. The appeal proceedings are, as follows: after the work of an indi-
vidual has been valued according to the point system the employee can appeal 
against the valuation and introduce their point of view on said valuation of their 
job.568 There may be numerous reasons behind why fewer females than males in all 
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areas of work have appealed their job valuations. These statistics cannot be analyzed 
or explained in their totality. 
However, one explanation is that women may not see the sense in appealing 
an unjust work valuation in a male dominated environment. People, including 
woman are so accustomed to the traditional way in which ‘typical female’ jobs have 
been valued that it goes unseen when such work is undervalued despite the objective 
criteria for the characterization of work. 
The individualised appeal process even as a last resort cannot result in reme-
dying general gender wage inequalities. Guy Ryder, the Director General of the ILO 
correctly questioned:  
‘Why after decades of legislation, decades of advocacy for equal pay and against 
gender discrimination, the gender pay gap worldwide is still around 20 percent and 
shows no signs of closing and why women’s participation rights in our labour forces 
are about 25 percentage points below those of men? What do we need to do, more of 
the same or something different?569 
Systematic inequality calls for the use of systematic instruments for eradication. The 
issue of gender inequality in the wage structure cannot be satisfactorily addressed in-
dividually. It can only be systematically remedied. If the views and attitudes causing 
the gender pay gap are not acknowledged and accounted for during the job valuation 
process, individual appeals cannot change the general discriminatory evaluation re-
sults. 
4.5.4 Sensitivity on the potential for discrimination in job evaluation procedures 
Research conducted on the effect of ERA on the gender pay gap revealed that within 
establishments people were not aware of the risk of gender discrimination.570 In order 
to implement ERA the trade union and the employer organisations organised a num-
                                                 
 
569
 Guy Ryder: ‘It`s time to unite against inequality’, 4th Uni World Indaba (2014) video: 
www.uniglobalcongress.com, from 9:49 to 10:35. 
570
 Brandl (2011), 18. 
Proportionate Income Differentials, p 136 of 186 
 
 
ber of seminars. Members of works councils, trade unions and human resources 
managers of different establishments were elevated to the role of ERA experts and 
educated accordingly. Some of these ERA experts became members of the PaKo and 
sought to implement ERA by evaluating work according to the levels in the ERA pay 
system and classified jobs accordingly. 
Research studies on ERA show that there was broad understanding that ERA 
is abstract and neutral and therefore free of the risk of gender discrimination.571 Al-
though a number of materials on the gender issue and the risk of discrimination were 
created it seemed that, in most cases, such material was not considered in the imple-
mentation of ERA.572 
In addition, the practical implementation of ERA was mostly been carried out 
by men. Research revealed that because ERA is a neutral system, people believed 
there was no risk of gender discrimination.573 This lack of sensitivity resulted in the 
gender issue being overlooked in the implementation of ERA. The parties imple-
menting ERA were convinced that they acted in a gender neutral fashion, while in 
fact they may have acted under the existing underlying views and attitudes when 
evaluating and classifying jobs. 
4.5.5 Suggested measures to improve gender equality 
Experience, derived from instances where the implementation of ERA worked better, 
reveal that it should be the primary goal to reach equal pay for work of equal 
value.574 It is suggested that sensitivity should be created through analysing the pay 
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data of the enterprise, analysing the job variation data, and looking at the relevant 
members of the PaKo and the decision makers in the valuation process.575 
It is also suggested that there should be more women who perform the func-
tion of evaluating work.576 It is recommended that external professional support be 
brought in to address the risks of traditional views and attitudes on gender roles that 
cause discrimination.577 
Due to the point discussed above, it is necessary that measures to improve the 
actual implementation of ERA be established. It is one thing to have a well-drafted 
solution to gender wage inequality on paper, but to actually practically implement 
such a solution is an important factor all of its own. Thus this thesis proposes that 
when searching for a process to remove the effects of vertical pay discrimination in-
herited from the past, ERA can provide insights as to how this can be achieved bring-
ing section 27 of the EEA to fruition. 
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5. Recommendations derived from ERA 
ERA can provide guidance on both the development of a pay structure and the im-
plementation of section 27 of the EEA. The purpose of this chapter is to establish 
recommendations drawn from the ERA implementation process.  
In this thesis the figures and in-depth discussions show that the South African 
pay gap is vast and is inherited from past apartheid practices. The Employment Con-
dition Commission has not yet met its mandate in terms of section 27 (4) of the EEA 
to provide norms and benchmarks on proportionate pay differentials. The provision 
requires that its implementation include the creation of criteria for proportionate in-
come differentials. This - the legal framework - is the starting point for how the 
German experience can add value to the implementation of collective agreements or 
policies to eliminate the apartheid wage gap. In addition, the chapter considers as-
pects of the ERA process and the content of the agreement that can inform the im-
plementation of section 27 of the EEA.  
This includes the ERA experience on the development of a neutral point sys-
tem for the evaluation of the different work tasks as well as the awareness on the im-
plementation phase. A objective and systematic pay structure is also what section 27 
of the EEA, the HR and the EP Code call for. 
5.1 The legal framework 
The German legislation offered a legal framework for the implementation of ERA 
which ensured that important actors played an active role in collective bargaining 
and in implementing ERA within companies. The German legal framework is, in 
some respects, similar to existing South African legislation. A key difference, how-
ever, is the system of co-determination. There is no representation of elected trade 
unionists on the boards of larger companies and groups of companies in South Af-
rica. Without a well-established system of co-determination difficulties may arise in 
implementing section 27 of the EEA by means of collective agreement in South Af-
rica. Efforts to encourage co-determination such as the workplace forums have also 
not taken hold in South Africa. 
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The South African Constitution and the LRA guarantee the freedom of bar-
gaining.578 Trade unions and employer organisations are legislatively enabled to 
agree on binding collective agreements regarding the progressive reduction of the 
pay gap as section 27 of the EEA provides. 
5.2 The decentralisation (from decentralisation to generalisation) 
The decentralisation of negotiations and the implementation of ERA was one ele-
ment in the successful implementation of ERA. After the general agreement with the 
employer organisations was agreed on in the pilot region, Baden-Wuerttemberg, the 
agreement was adopted in other regions with regional modifications. This technique 
can be transferred to the South African case. It may be crucial to find a pilot model 
which may become a role model for other areas and which will aid in attaining initial 
experience. Such a pilot model should fulfil the qualifications Südwestmetall and IG 
Metall provided. It should be an environment where the will exists to eliminate the 
apartheid wage gap. This can be an establishment and does not have to be a region. 
However, the common understanding should be that the negotiations on the company 
level should be done in a way that the result can be used as a general role model for 
the specific industry and beyond. 
5.3 Proactive Regulators 
Proactive framers who respect their negotiation partner were important for the suc-
cess of ERA. Südwestmetall and the IG Metall Baden-Wuerttemberg were backed by 
their national organisations but had to conduct negotiations by themselves. Their re-
spective views and attitudes on the negotiation process and the importance of collec-
tive bargaining thus largely affected the success of the negotiations on ERA. The 
presence and absence of proactive framers in Germany played a crucial role in 
choosing the correct pilot region where negotiations would more likely prove most 
successful. The proactive framers largely influenced the success of ERA itself. In 
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implementing section 27 of the EEA it can be derived from the German experience 
that there is a need for the involvement of proactive framers. Such proactive framers 
must be drawn from both the employees and employers representatives. Both capital 
and labour have to agree on the elimination of the apartheid wage gap and must be 
prepared to negotiate over an extended period, if necessary. 
This element is more important than the industry or the region selected for 
collective bargaining. It may be advisable not only to look at employer organisations 
but also to look at companies that may be interested in being the first to address the 
prolonged vertical pay discrimination. It is crucial that trade unions want to become 
active in the implementation of section 27 of the EEA. The democratic structure of 
trade unions and employer organisations is important. 
5.4 The democratic structure of trade unions and employer organisations  
These actors reflect the views and insights of the workers and the employers. Both 
the employer organisation and the trade union have to be well established in the envi-
ronment and needs structures for reflection during the negotiations. The bargaining 
structure of the trade union should include employees of the establishment to ensure 
democratic legitimacy as a means of knowing and understanding the employees per-
spective. 
5.5 Institutions, well-embedded in their environment 
In the German case the IG Metall and Südwestmetall were well-established in their 
environment and were able to propose radical changes to their members. However, 
democratic structures in South Africa are relatively young. The nature of collective 
bargaining in South Africa is more adversarial than in the German metal and electri-
cal industry. The nature of collective bargaining in German can also differs between 
the various industries and from one bargaining region to another. The nature of col-
lective bargaining in Germany is more cooperative if the following conditions are 
given: highly unionised self-confident workforce, a strong self-confident trade union, 
a pro-active trade union oriented works council with substantial regulatory authority 
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and a management under the control of the supervisory board which is willing to en-
ter into collective bargaining as a means to influencing working conditions. 
In South Africa, trade unions are well-grounded politically and played an im-
portant role in ending apartheid. It would be advisable to firstly implement the provi-
sion on a pilot project, and then the outcome as a general model. A criteria for choos-
ing such a trial should be: 
1) the size of trade union membership and  
2) the management experience with collective bargaining and their view of it as 
a means of shaping working conditions. 
5.6 The content of the ERA agreements 
The practical know-how of the ERA experience combined with the support of scien-
tific research in a pilot model could do much to eliminate discrimination in pay struc-
tures. 
5.6.1 Eliminating discrimination from the pay structure 
ERA structures on the criteria for pay levels refer to the work required by the job, the 
stress which show up in a workplace and also include an element for performance-
related pay. It is a system which is permeable and when tasks change or single em-
ployees perform additional tasks they can be shifted into a different pay level (which 
may be a higher pay level). The pay-level criteria take into account the skills of an 
employee but the core concept is the demands of the job. 
The criteria for the grading are neutral; they do not discriminate on the basis 
of gender nor do they differentiate between workers carrying out manual labour and 
those conducting intellectual tasks. ERA has shown that it is important to focus, dur-
ing the implementation phase on the purpose of the agreement. The lack of perform-
ance in eradicating the gender pay gap has shown that views and attitudes which 
caused discriminatory structures do not disappear by drafting a discrimination neutral 
model. The focus and aims of a discrimination neutral model have to be practically 
implemented. 
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5.6.2 Pay categories organised by a neutral point system 
In the past employees were often remunerated on the basis of education and the title 
of a position. Job contents can, however, change. The opportunity which the point 
system offers job valuation is more neutral. Discriminatory elements cannot easily 
influence job valuations where a neutral point system for the evaluation of jobs ex-
ists. However, as we can see from experience with ERA, discriminatory views and 
attitudes may still affect job valuations. Although this may be the case it is advisable 
to develop criteria similar to the ERA-System for one establishment and to derive 
from the creation of such criteria in the particular establishment which work should 
be valued equally and to what extent differentiation between jobs is justified.  
5.6.3 Pay scales 
The pay scale in chapter 4.4.3.2 showed in percentage the differences between the 
wages in the German metal and electrical industry. The vertical pay differentials are 
much less than in South Africa. Since section 27 of the EEA calls for proportionate 
income differentials similar system may be developed which describes something 
like a mid-term aim. After a valuation of the jobs according to an ‘ERA-company-
model’ the extent of pay differentials may be analysed. A model for the implementa-
tion of section 27 of the EEA could then be developed which may reduce nominal 
wage losses to an acceptable minimum. 
5.6.4 The implementation time line 
As experience with ERA shows, implementation works best and is most effective 
when progressively realised over a period of time. The implementation of ERA over 
a period of several years enabled nominal wage losses to be avoided which would be 
a positive for South Africa. In addition the implementation of section 27 of the EEA 
over a protracted period of time would correspond with subsection 27 (2) of the EEA 
which calls for progressive steps. 
5.6.5 Cost neutrality 
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Wage cost neutrality could be adapted in a similar way as it was in the ERA agree-
ment. It would mean that the regular pay raise and negotiations on pay would con-
tinue. The tools used for cost neutrality in the implementation of ERA could be ef-
fectively used in South Africa in implementing section 27. The timeline, the varying 
wage increases and the clearing were also helpful in realising the new system under 
ERA and may prove as effective in the realisation of section 27 of the EEA. 
5.6.6 Conflict resolution mechanisms 
The resolution of conflicts during the ERA negotiations was not always easy and in 
practice conflicts arose during the implementation phase of the ERA. However, con-
flict resolution mechanisms were provided involving all the bargaining parties and 
providing a system of appeal which enabled people to express their grievances and 
lodge their complaints. It should be noted that at no time did the number of members 
of either IG Metall or the employer organisations decline. 
Without providing a conflict mechanism where everybody had the opportu-
nity to be heard and be taken seriously this may have been different. To minimize 
and in some case avoid conflicts over ERA, it was important that the collective bar-
gaining parties worked in conjunction with one another and those parties with griev-
ances were heard. It is undoubtedly clear that in order to reduce the vertical wage gap 
in South Africa section 27 of the EEA needs to be implemented. This is the purpose 
of legislation. There may be people who are disappointed during the implementation 
phase, however, to avoid severe discontent the ERA conflict resolution mechanisms 
should be followed in the implementation of section 27 of the EEA. 
5.6.7 Scientific support 
The support by researchers in the development of models and creation of possible so-
lutions might help to realise the implementation of norms. Section 27 (4) of the EEA 
in fact calls for research to be conducted. The successful drafting and implementation 
of ERA was possible due to the large scale input of scientific research. This in-
volvement of research on practical solutions would also be advisable in a South Afri-
can pilot project. 
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5.7. ERA and section 27 of the EEA: a summary of findings 
ERA has shown that an environment which guarantees the freedom of bargaining can 
create a solution for a non discriminatory pay structure between the occupational 
levels. In summary, this was achieved by: 
1) developing different pay elements in regard to demands and stresses of a job; 
2) developing criteria for the valuation of work and 
3) developing a pay scale which includes a concept for the proportionality be-
tween the occupational levels. 
In the German case the following elements contributed to the success of ERA: 
1) a legal framework which guarantees the freedom of collective bargaining in a 
similar way to that in South Africa 
2) a decentralised bargaining structure creating a model which could be used to 
generate a nationwide solution 
3) an employer organisation and trade union structure well-embedded in their 
environment  
4) the democratic involvement of the relevant actors 
Furthermore, ERA has shown that: 
3) the implementation phase requires as much attention as the drafting phase; 
4) discrimination-neutral criteria do not protect against the influence of views an 
attitudes of actors during the implementation phase; 
5) a clear focus on the elimination of discriminatory practices during the imple-
mentation phase may result in the avoidance of discriminatory views and atti-
tudes being largely influential.  
For the implementation of section 27 of the EEA this experience may be taken into 
account by: 
1) developing implementation measures with experienced trade unionists who 
are aware of the vertical pay gap and support the development of a model for 
its elimination; 
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2) choosing an establishment in which to conduct the initial negotiations on im-
plementation of section 27 can be seen as decentralising the negotiation on 
the implementation of section 27 while creating a role model for more gener-
alized negotiations; 
3) ensuring that an employer takes on the role of a proactive framer; 
4) establishing support through research and 
5) using the pay models set out in ERA as a role model for framing a model 
within the chosen  establishment to be used as a general model later. 
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6. Conclusions – The way forward 
It was an element of the success with ERA to carefully choose a pilot region which 
was Baden-Wuerttemberg. For the South African case a pilot model could be devel-
oped in a company or an institution. As in the ERA case this establishment should 
fulfil at least two criteria. An understanding has to exist that the vertical pay gap is a 
result of unacceptable discriminatory practices of the past which are to be addressed 
by section 27 of the EEA. There also should be an understanding of the tool which is 
to be used for its implementation. According to section 27 (3) of the EEA the pri-
mary instrument would be a collective agreement which would be ideal since the 
views of the workers and the employers would be integrated. If an institution such as 
a foundation, school or university is chosen for the pilot project, a guideline for this 
institution could be a tool which would be in line with section 27 (3) no 4 of the 
EEA. However, if there are several options, the collective agreement should be cho-
sen because of its legal strength. 
Much can be gained from the insights provided by ERA when considering 
how best to fulfil section 27 of the EEA drafting on an agreement and its implemen-
tation. As with the ERA, two phases need to be distinguished.  
In the drafting phase IG Metall and Südwestmetall did what section 27 (4) of 
the EEA calls for. Norms and benchmarks for discrimination-neutral criteria for a 
pay structure were created. In following the process with regard to section 27 of the 
EEA the drafting phase could be divided into three steps. The first step could be the 
description of the pay elements. Remuneration could include, as in ERA, for instance 
basic pay as the core element and in addition an allowance for stress and perform-
ance-related pay. The percentage of each of these elements of the total remuneration 
should also be calculated. In the second step the criteria for each pay element could 
be defined. The basic pay, as the central element, could refer to criteria which de-
scribe tasks within jobs and evaluate them. This step will have a central role but if 
one establishment were to be chosen an ‛ERA-lightʼ solution could be developed due 
to the fact that there are many more and varied tasks in an industry as in a single in-
stitution. 
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The valuation should be work-related and the question to be asked during the 
development of criteria should relate to aspects which justify a differentiation and if 
so, to which extent. The differentiation between the various criteria within the ERA-
Agreements579 may provide not only a role model for a structure but also for the de-
gree of differentiation. 
The third step is the development of a system of wage groups and the connec-
tion between valuation of the work and the position within the wage groups. It is ad-
visable to limit the number of pay categories. To avoid discrimination, the differen-
tiation needs a justification not, the other way around. 
The second phase is the implementation phase. The actors for the implemen-
tation of ERA in some cases partly changed and also many conflicts arose. This 
could be avoided in the South African case by choosing an establishment for a pilot 
project. The implementation could be done by the same actors who negotiated the 
model. As described earlier, in some establishments, during the implementation 
phase of ERA, the gender pay gap was not in focus. For the South African case, dis-
criminatory practices are the focus of section 27 of the EEA which is, the progressive 
reduction of disproportionate vertical income differentials. ERA was focussed on the 
equity between blue and white collar workers. The gender pay gap was not the main 
consideration and since the criteria were neutral not every actor seemed to be aware 
of the risk that views and attitudes can also influence acts during the valuation of 
work by overlooking elements of jobs.  
The implementation of ERA shows, in addition, how a cost-neutral imple-
mentation of section 27 of the EEA can be designed. After developing a concept for 
proportionate income differentials the existing pay structure can be evaluated. 
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An example from practice for first steps to more proportionate income differ-
entials is that of Pretoria Portland Cement ltd. (PPC) a leading supplier of cement.580 
Ketso Gordhan, CEO of PPC at the time, found out that he earns 120 times more 
than the lowest full time worker in the company. He agreed to reduce his income by 
1 million rand and convinced 60 executives to agree to a reduction of their wages to 
contribute to the payment of lower earning employees. The wages of the lowest more 
or less 1000 income earners could be raised 10.000 Rand a year and the pay gap in 
that establishment was reduced to 1:40.581 Gordhan stated in an interview by Hilton 
that;  
''We live in a country where income inequality is pretty high. We’ve got a Gini 
coefficient that’s amongst the worst in the world. But, more importantly, when I was 
appointed CEO, I went to the shop floor, spent some quality time talking to small 
groups of workers and understood from their point of view that the salary was too 
tight to live on. I made my own independent assessment and understood that we 
needed to do something about it. Everybody clearly wants more salary. That’s never 
a debate. The question is, is it a fair request or requirement or demand? And in my 
view I said that it was. And I felt that a 1:120 ratio between me and the lowest-paid 
person in PPC was wrong, and by this October we’ve reduced it to 1:40. The only 
way you can achieve that is by cutting at the top and increasing at the bottom (...). So 
the 60 top executives at PPC joined me in this initiative and did so happily and 
voluntarily. When we invested a significant amount of cash in the bottom 1 000 
workers in PPC, each of them got roughly R 10 000 a year more. So if you do the 
simple maths, my giving up R 1 m was equal to 100 families getting R 10 000 each 
more. If you look at it, it’s a compelling story. Was my quality of life fundamentally 
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affected by that? Definitely not. Was their quality of life affected by that? Definitely 
yes.''582 
Gordhan's actions make it evident that in order to bring about change to wage ine-
qualities in South Africa, role players need to be actively involved. However, to 
make changes sustainable and durable collective agreements may be the best instru-
ment to stabilise a development towards more proportional income. In order to 
achieve long term positive results changes need to be developed on a broader scale, 
actions taken by individuals such as Gordhan will not have long-term implications. 
Such individuals in favour of change may leave establishments for various reasons 
and any progress made may regress. Experiences derived from the implementation of 
ERA have shown how collective agreements can play a vital role in the reduction of 
wage inequalities and ensures that steps taken towards equality remain ongoing. 
Section 27 of the EEA provides a sufficient legal framework for the eradica-
tion of discriminatory vertical pay inequalities inherited from the past in South Af-
rica. The legislative provision has been thoughtfully constructed and is a remarkable 
legislative tool to address the apartheid wage gap. The persisting issue is, however, 
the failure to implement the provision. This thesis questions why such a distinctive 
legislative provision, with the potential to bring about change has yet to be imple-
mented. 
As such a significant legislative tool for the eradication of disproportionate 
vertical income differentials exists, why not use it? The thesis proposes a method, 
bases on the ERA, for doing so. 
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Annex 5: ERA-Value-numeral-grading-procedure for evaluation and grading work 
tasks 
1. Knowledge and capabilities 
Knowledge and capabilities include the knowledge and physical knowhow respec-
tively skills which are required to perform the job assignment. Knowledge and physi-
cal knowhow respectively skills are acquired by instruction and exercise, systematic 
training, school education / vocational training / university education and experience. 
In considering the necessary duration for instruction, exercise, systematic training, 
education and experience, has the appropriate execution (fulfilment) of the work task 
according to the collectively agreed reference performance (s 3 of the ERA Agree-
ment) be taken as a basis. 
Knowledge includes knowledge basis and the ability of its use (mental flexibility) 
which are required for the performance of the work task. 
Professional requirements of a work task inherent the necessary 
knowledge/experience to fulfill the work task on: 
- the work environment 
- the workflow 
- conflict resolution, moderation and presentation technique. 
Physical knowhow respectively skills include requirements on senses as well as the 
physical and sensory abilities. The physical knowhow respectively skills which are 
needed to fulfil the work task are considered. For purposes of valuation the necessary 
responsiveness and dexterity, that is the reliability, accuracy and the degree of free-
dom of movement of the body and single limbs has to be taken into account. 
For the valuation of knowledge and physical knowhow respectively skills it is not 
relevant wherever and however these are acquired. 
All necessary knowledge and physical knowhow respectively skills will be taken into 
account irrespectively of how often or how long these are made use of as long as they 
characterize the work task and its significance. 
The level of the requirement depends on the variety and specialised depth of the nec-
essary knowledge. Point of reference is the knowledge shared through a lower secon-
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dary education which can unusually be assumed from average employees. 
School degrees which are required for the entry of a specific education are not addi-
tionally evaluated. The shared knowledge of the required school education is covered 
by the valuation of the education. 
1.1 Training 
This part characteristic covers knowledge and physical knowhow respectively skills 
which can be targeted gained in a corresponding time period by instruction or sys-
tematic training. The evaluation takes the training time into account which is neces-
sary in addition to the initial level to perform the work task without relevant previous 
knowledge. 
1.1.1 Instruction is the communication of information on the simple tasks, this means tasks 
or procedures to perform simple work. It can be done with or without methodical dis-
tribution. These tasks can be performed after corresponding exercise without previ-
ous working knowledge. Exercise is the repetition of a task. 
1.1.2 Systematic training is the systematic communication of knowledge and physical 
knowhow respectively skills by systematically instruction, training as well as experi-
ence by performance. 
1.2 Education and experience 
1.2.1 Education 
This part characteristic covers knowledge and physical knowhow respectively skills 
which are imparted by norm school education, vocational training583 as laid down in 
the German Vocational Training Act (BBiG) or other official recognized training or 
study. Education includes the necessary task-specific advanced education respective-
ly vocational training. Insofar as no comparable equivalent official recognized educa-
tion of the before mentioned kind exists this will be assigned to a characteristic-level 
according to its significance. 
The valuation of the necessary education has taken all training periods and education 
                                                 
 
583
 Helm & Göpfert (2015), 39. 
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contents into account insofar as it exceeds the lower secondary education. This also 
applies to entry requirements like internships and periods of work experience. 
In the steps B 1 and B 2 is a vocational training based on a lower secondary educa-
tion assumed. Other types of vocational training with higher entry requirements will 
be assigned to a characteristic-level according to its significance. In each case the 
current content of the vocational training or academic and occupational education 
which is needed to perform the work task will be valued. 
1.2.2 This part characteristic includes knowledge and physical knowhow respectively skills 
which are additionally needed after the completion of an education to perform a work 
task and which acquired by performing the work task. The necessary period of ex-
perience to perform the work task will be valued. 
Protocol note: in the course of this, the actual length of exercise is irrelevant. 
1. Knowledge and Capabilities 
1.1 Training and exercise  
Level Description  Points 
A 1 Knowledge, physical knowhow respective skills which re-
quire a one-time instruction and short exercise.  
3 
A 2 Knowledge, physical knowhow respective skills which re-
quire a instruction and longer exercise.  
4 
A 3 Knowledge, physical knowhow respective skills which re-
quire instruction and exercise of several weeks.  
5 
A 4 Knowledge, physical knowhow respective skills which re-
quire instruction and exercise over a longer period then A 3 
which may include systematic training and theoretical 
knowledge sharing.  
7 
A 5 Knowledge, physical knowhow respective skills which re-
quire comprehensive, systematic instruction over half a year 
9 
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or more.  
1.2.1 Education 
B 1 Completed normal two-year vocational training as laid down 
in the German Vocational Training Act (BBiG) 
10 
B 2 Completed normal three- or three and a half-year vocational 
training as laid down in the German Vocational Training Act 
(BBiG) 
13 
B 3 Completed vocational training as laid down in the German 
Vocational Training Act (BBiG) and a follow-up normal 
one-year full time professional education (e.g. master 
craftsman education  of the Chamber of Industry and Com-
merce, IHK).  
16 
B 4 Completed vocational training as laid down in the German 
Vocational Training Act (BBiG) and a follow-up normal 
two-year full time professional education  (e.g. Certified 
technician) 
19 
B 5 Completed study at a technical college (FH)  24 
B 6 Completed study at an university  29 
1.2.1 Experience 
E 1 Up to one year  1 
E 2 More than one year up to two years  3 
E 3 More than two years up to three years  5 
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E 4 More than three years up to five years  8 
E 5 More than five years  10 
 
2. Thinking 
Thinking denotes the reception and processing of information, as well as the use of 
solution models and if necessary the development of solutions. 
Solution models are intellectually or in writing existing structures to find solution out 
of which within the context of the work task suitable solutions can be chosen. 
Thinking is also necessary for work tasks which do not require specific 
knowledge/experience.  
Valued are difficulties and complexity: 
- of the task and problems, 
- of the use and development of model solutions, 
- of the reception and processing of information (e.g. concentration of testing tasks, 
tensed readiness for essential intervention and action by surveillance activities). 
The necessity for the conscious elimination distracting/disturbing stimuli will be taken 
into consideration the difficulty and complexity of the thinking. 
2. Thinking 
Level  Description  Points  
D 1 Basic tasks which require easy-to-grasp reception, perception 
and processing of information.  
1 
D 2 Tasks which require more difficult reception, perception of 
information or tasks which require the use of standardised so-
lutions.  
3 
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D 3 Tasks which require difficult reception, perception of infor-
mation or tasks which require selecting and adopting suitable 
solutions out of familiar solution models 
5 
D 4 Comprehensive tasks which require the combination of fa-
miliar suitable solutions.  
8 
D 5 Specific needs which require further development of familiar 
solutions. 
12 
D 6 New type of needs which require the development of new so-
lutions. 
16 
D 7 New types of complex needs which require innovative think-
ing and long-term development trends have to be taken into 
account.  
20 
 
3. Room for manoeuvre and responsibility 
The room for manoeuvre comprises the degree of freedom and responsibility for the: 
- scope for the activity, 
- scope for scheduling and 
- margin of decision-making. 
Valued are the degree of freedom and responsibility of: 
- the performance of the work task, 
- the selection of the necessary means or 
- the decision to be taken. 
The valuation has to take into account if and how far work organization, workflow, 
technical protection measures and type of control limit the room for manoeuvre / the 
responsibility. 
3. Room for manoeuvre and responsibility  
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Level Description  Points 
H 1 Carrying out work according to instruction  1 
H 2 Carrying out work under instruction with little room for ma-
noeuvre in individual operations (individual work steps 
within a subtask). 
3 
H 3 Carrying out work under instruction with room for manoeu-
vre in subtasks (part of an overall work task or a workflow). 
5 
H 4 Carrying out work under instruction with room for manoeu-
vre within a work task. 
7 
H 5 Carrying out work under general instruction with room for 
manoeuvre within the work task. Alternative course of action 
or options are given. 
9 
H 6 Carrying out work on the basis of targets with room for ma-
noeuvre for an area of responsibility. For the task execution 
the independent use of available methods and aids is neces-
sary. 
11 
H 7 Carrying out work on the basis of targets with extended room 
for manoeuvre for a complex area of responsibility. 
14 
H 8 Carrying out work with a wide margin of manoeuvre for a 
broad area of responsibility. 
17 
H 7 Carrying out work on the basis of targets for an enlarged 
room for manoeuvre for a complex area of responsibility. 
14 
 
4. Communication 
Communication in the sense of the work task includes:  
- the exchange of information 
- the necessary cooperation 
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- the necessary harmonization and coordination 
- the representation of interests towards other bodies within and/or beyond a work 
group respectively a work area. 
This does not imply the communication which is needed for the employee manage-
ment (see characteristic 5). 
The degree of the communication needs to perform the work task will be valued. 
4. Communication 
K 1 Information gathering and transfer in order to perform the 
work task (e.g. take an order and deregister, report occurring 
deviations). 
1 
K 2 Coordination in single issues in direct context with the work 
task (e.g. discussing occurring deviations and coordinate). 
3 
K 3 Coordination in routine individual beyond single routine is-
sues in frequent differing conditions in direct context of the 
work task (e.g. clarifying occurring deviations). 
5 
K 4 Cooperation and coordination within the delegated complex 
of tasks. Different interests arise. 
7 
K 5 Representation of interests for the delegated complex of tasks 
to third parties, with varying purposes (e.g. conversation 
buyers with suppliers). 
10 
K 6 Negotiations of cross functional importance with third par-
ties, with varying purposes. 
13 
 
5. Employee management 
Employee management includes the personal and simultaneous professional authority 
on employees allocated to him or her, possibly by inclusion of employees from other 
areas; a disciplinary allocation is not a mandatory prerequisite. 
The necessary communication processes in the specific management situation for the 
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leadership – such as support, supervision and assessment - are taken into account by 
considering the general conditions. 
General conditions are factors which influence the management circumstances, such 
as e.g. business processes, resources, staff structure (inter alia number, qualification), 
human resources development, occupational safety. 
Valued are by tasks with employee management 
- the necessary form of communication, 
- the requirements on the design of the management process under different frame-
work conditions. 
Unlike the above definition is pronounced professional authority valued with the level 
F 1 without the need for simultaneous personnel authority. 
Tasks without employee management are valued without this characteristic. 
5. Employee management 
F 1  Giving instructions under constant and manageable basic 
conditions and targets. 
2 
F 2  Explaining targets and clarifying tasks by consulting employ-
ees. Changing conditions and its consequences according to 
their nature and extend manageable. 
3 
F 3 Reaching a shared perception on tasks for target achieve-
ment, even in cases of partly differing interests. Changing 
conditions and its effects can be estimated. 
4 
F 4 Joint development of task- and sector-based as well as indi-
vidual targets in partly differing interests. Changing condi-
tions and its effects are more likely difficult to estimate. 
5 
F 5 Joint, on personal conviction of the employees focussed de-
velopment and design of task- and sector-based as well as in-
dividual targets in frequently differing interests, with own/or 
others personnel. Changing conditions and its effects are dif-
ficult to estimate, cross-functional and cross-sectoral. 
7 
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Annex 6: Grading example Auditor no 1 pay category 6 
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Auditor no 1584, 585 
Pre-allocation of bills/audit 
B1 E1 D2 H2 K2 F0 20 PC6 
 
1. Knowledge and Capabilities 
1.2.1 Education 
B 1 Completed normal two-year vocational training as laid down 
in the German Vocational Training Act (BBiG) 
10 
1.2.1 Experience 
E 1 Up to one year  1 
 
2. Thinking 
D 2 Tasks which require more difficult reception, perception of 
information or tasks which require the use of standardised so-
lutions.  
3 
 
3. Room for manoeuvre and responsibility  
H 2 Carrying out work under instruction with little room for ma- 3 
                                                 
 
584
 ERA pay category example no 01.02.02.05 (auditor 1), http://www2.igmetall.de/homepages/era-
wissen/material/tarifbeispiel.html. 
585
 Different types of auditors are known in ERA. E g it exists also an auditor 2 (pay category example 
01.02.02.10). The auditor 2 is in pay category 8 since he audits the supplier invoices, 
http://www2.igmetall.de/homepages/era-wissen/material/tarifbeispiel.html. 
Proportionate Income Differentials, p 179 of 186 
 
 
noeuvre in individual operations (individual work steps 
within a subtask). 
 
4. Communication 
K 2 Coordination in single issues in direct context with the work 
task (e.g. discussing occurring deviations and coordinate). 
3 
 
5. Employee management 
F 0 no  
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Annex 7: Grading example project manager product development pay category 16 
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Project manager product 
development586 
Management of product-
related hardware and soft-
ware projects 
B5 E4 D5 H5 K4 F1 62 PC16 
 
1. Knowledge and Capabilities 
1.2.1 Education 
B 5 Completed study at a technical college (FH)  24 
1.2.1 Experience 
E 3 More than two years up to three years  5 
 
2. Thinking 
D 5 Specific needs which require further development of familiar 
solutions. 
12 
 
3. Room for manoeuvre and responsibility  
H 5 Carrying out work under general instruction with room for 
manoeuvre within the work task. Alternative course of action 
or options are given. 
9 
                                                 
 
586
 ERA pay category example no 06.02.03.25 (project manager product development), 
http://www2.igmetall.de/homepages/era-wissen/material/tarifbeispiel.html. 
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4. Communication 
K 4 Cooperation and coordination within the delegated complex 
of tasks. Different interests arise. 
7 
 
5. Employee management 
F 1  Giving instructions under constant and manageable basic 
conditions and targets. 
2 
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Annex 8: Grading example office help pay category 2 
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Office help587 
Performing of simple ad-
ministration tasks 
A2 E0 D1 H1 K1 F0 7 PC2 
 
1. Knowledge and Capabilities 
1.2.1 Education 
A 2 Knowledge, physical knowhow respective skills which re-
quire a instruction and longer exercise.  
4 
1.2.1 Experience 
E 0 no  
 
2. Thinking 
D 1 Basic tasks which require easy-to-grasp reception, perception 
and processing of information.  
1 
 
3. Room for manoeuvre and responsibility  
H 1 Carrying out work according to instruction  1 
 
                                                 
 
587
 ERA pay category example no 05.01.01.05 (office help), http://www2.igmetall.de/homepages/era-
wissen/material/tarifbeispiel.html. 
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4. Communication 
K 1 Information gathering and transfer in order to perform the 
work task (e.g. take an order and deregister, report occurring 
deviations). 
1 
 
5. Employee management 
F 0 no  
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Annex 9: Grading example storekeeper pay category 2 
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Storekeeper588 
Carrying out of storage  
activities 
A3 E0 D1 H1 K1 F0 8 PC2 
 
1. Knowledge and Capabilities 
1.2.1 Education 
A 3 Knowledge, physical knowhow respective skills which re-
quire instruction and exercise of several weeks.  
5 
1.2.1 Experience 
E 0 no  
 
2. Thinking 
D 1 Basic tasks which require easy-to-grasp reception, perception 
and processing of information.  
1 
 
3. Room for manoeuvre and responsibility  
H 1 Carrying out work according to instruction  1 
 
                                                 
 
588
 ERA pay category example no 02.03.01.05 (storekeeper), http://www2.igmetall.de/homepages/era-
wissen/material/tarifbeispiel.html. 
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4. Communication 
K 1 Information gathering and transfer in order to perform the 
work task (e.g. take an order and deregister, report occurring 
deviations). 
1 
 
5. Employee management 
F 0 no  
 
  
Proportionate Income Differentials, p 186 of 186 
 
 
 
 
